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“Sometimes a sentence can  
be understood only if it is  
read at the right tempo. My 
 sentences are all supposed 
 to be read slowly.” 
 
Wittgenstein
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1 Introduction 
All philosophical questions have started as simple and naïve musings. Philosophical 
questions about words for emotions are no exception. For example, it is quite common to 
hear someone say: “I thought I knew what longing was, but now that X has happened I 
for the first time know what it really means”. We also hear people emphatically exclaim 
“I have this emotion I can’t put into words, and it’s really frustrating”. From sayings as 
these, those of us that are curious and inquisitive by nature, start philosophising. 
A central idea of Wittgenstein’s book Philosophical Investigations1 is that philosophical 
questioning and argumentation is riddled with linguistic confusion. Words can play tricks 
with us and lead us astray. Wittgenstein famously said that “Philosophy is a battle against 
the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language”. (§109) Wittgenstein 
indirectly asks an important question about the relationship between professional 
philosophy and its origins in inquisitiveness and naïve musings.  
My aim in this essay is to see how a Wittgensteinian perspective could change naïve, but 
philosophically ‘contaminated’, questions. To narrow down the scope of the essay I have 
chosen philosophically contaminated questions words for emotions as the example we 
will be dealing with. Wittgenstein has, beyond doubt, many interesting things to say about 
words for emotions, so we have to set some further boundaries for this essay. The first 
reservation I have to make is that I will focus on how is it that language is public rather 
than tackling the Private Language Argument in itself. The discussion will not be on 
whether the Private Language Argument is valid, but where and how publicity enters the 
picture in (our natural) language. The idea is that since there cannot be a private language, 
then (our natural) language must in some way be public, i.e. the opposite of private.  
The last reservation I have to make is that in the discussion about the publicity of 
language, is that eminent philosophers like Kripke, Crispin Wright and also to some 
extent John McDowell, will not be given a full treatment that cover all the nuances of 
their readings of Wittgenstein. In particular, Kripke and Wright will in this essay be used 
more as the backdrop of a criticism of some problematic ideas about language, than being 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. “Philosophical investigations”. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe.  Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001. Here after referred to as PI. All references a “§” and a number are to PI unless otherwise 
noted. 
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subjects of a thorough examination. I will expound their ideas only to the extent that is 
needed to make the argumentation of this essay clear. The criticisms that are made could 
have been spelt out in detail, but this essay is not the place for that. 
The progression of this essay 
This essay is divided into main parts. The first deals with what role publicity has in rule-
following and in the second the lessons from the first are applied in an examination about 
words for emotions. In chapters 2 through 6 it is argued that McDowell’s understanding 
of Wittgenstein's insistence on the publicity of language is better than that of Crispin 
Wright. Kripke is reading of Wittgenstein is given a short presentation as a background 
for the debate between Wright and McDowell. The discussion of McDowell is 
complicated by the fact that he on one important point later changed his mind. It is shown 
that this change is best understood by contrasting McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein 
with the one of Edward H. Minar.  
Finally, in part two of this essay, the ramifications of the discussions in part one are 
explored with an examination of words for emotions as an example. It will also be shown 
that a taking Wittgensteinian outlook on philosophy leaves us with a whole range of 
unexplored possibilities of examinations of human life that have great potential.  
Consequently, this essay can be read equally well from two different perspectives: The 
first is to read part one as a preparation for part two. It is possible to read the discussion of 
the publicity of language as a necessary preliminary to a study of words for emotions. The 
second way of reading this essay, is to read it as an inquiry into the publicity of language, 
and taking the passages about words for emotions as an example of the fruitful 
consequences of the this first discussion. 
Some main themes of Philosophical Investigations 
A sketch of some of the main concepts in PI will make the detours later in the essay fewer 
and less tedious. 
One of the background ideas in PI is that using language is, in some way or another, 
going by rules. There must be a consistency in how we use words, and where there is 
consistency there are rules. Wright seems to prefer the word ‘pattern’ over ‘rule’, but you 
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have to dig deep to find the difference. This intuitive idea is easily developed into a 
Platonistic account of language. ‘Platonistic’ here means that the meaning of a word is 
thought of as something constant that we can appeal to whenever we are in doubt.2 An 
example: reading McDowell I notice he has a peculiar way of writing essays and I decide 
to baptize this way of writing ‘McDowellian’. Then the meaning of the word 
‘McDowellian’ is what corresponds with my baptismal intentions. And language consists 
of the baptismal intentions behind the words, and the consistent use of words so that the 
words always lean on the same baptismal intentions. 
A private language is, by Wittgenstein’s definition, a language where the words refer to 
my inner experiences (of which emotions are the concern of this essay), so that no one 
else can understand what it (really) means. Such a language would be private, not only 
because it would be hard for other people to understand what I say, but because the words 
in such a language would refer to states that are essentially private and not only ‘hidden’ 
or difficult to understand. Wittgenstein’s criticism of such a private language is relevant 
for an inquiry into words for emotions because words for emotions are obvious candidates 
for being for ‘private’ words. No one can look up my experience to check if we mean the 
exact same thing when we talk about the, as far as we know, same emotions. At least that 
seems to be the thought behind sayings like “I think I know what you mean, but I’m not 
sure because I have never (for example) lost someone close to me”. Or so the newborn 
philosopher might think, as she probably already is engulfed by semi-philosophical 
vocabulary. 
Combining the idea of language as rule-following with the idea of a private language, we 
could say that when we want to convey the occurrence of a particular inner state, we can 
use the name given to this particular inner state. This is only possible if the baptismal 
intentions behind a word are stable in such a way that what a word refers to does not 
change over time. This need for stable baptismal intentions is what Wittgenstein attacks 
with the so called is right/seems right problem. The is right/seems right problem is that: in 
                                                 
2 See for example: Kripke (Kripke, Saul A. Wittgenstein: On rules and private language. Oxford: Basil, 
Blackwell, 1982.), page 54; Arrington (Arrington, Robert L. “Following a rule” in Wittgenstein: A critical 
reader, 119-137. Edited by Hans-Johann Glock. Malden: Blackwell, 2001.), page 134; McGinn (McGinn, 
Marie. Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge, 1997. ) page 80: “…the view, 
sometimes known as Platonism, that meanings are abstract entities that determine or show how a word is to 
be applied…”. 
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a private language the only way we have available to check that the baptismal intentions 
behind a word stay the same is by relying on our memory; but there is no way of knowing 
whether we actually remember right or just believe we remember right. 
The answer to the is right/seems right problem has often been that we must find what it is 
that in fact does secure stability in the baptismal intentions, and thereby a consistent use 
of the word. The most widespread answer to this challenge is to say that language must in 
some way be public. Only then can we avoid the is right/seems right problem. Concepts 
such as ‘public’, ‘publicity’, ‘communal’, ‘community’ are used in answering what the 
opposite of ‘private’ is. Closer descriptions of what the ‘publicity of language’ consist in 
use concepts such as ‘practice’, ‘communal practice’, ‘institution’ and ‘shared form of 
life’ in an attempt to describe how language can be the opposite of private, and thus avoid 
the is right/seems right problem. Most of these concepts will be discussed later. 
The last topic of this brief sketch of the main themes of PI is Wittgenstein’s attitude 
towards philosophy, exemplified by the quote above: “Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language”. (§109) In the same spirit 
Wittgenstein maintains that we should dissolve philosophical problems and not answer 
them (§133). Furthermore he says that we in philosophy should not put forward theses 
(§128), but disentangle the philosophical problems. It is difficult to understand exactly 
what the difference between disentangling questions and answering them is supposed to 
be. Is Wittgenstein saying that philosophical questions are uninteresting? Should 
philosophy as a discipline close itself down? From Wittgenstein’s attitude towards 
philosophy arises the question about the relationship between those questions we know 
from the history of philosophy, and the musings and questions of everyday life. 
The question of the connection between Wittgenstein’s attitude towards philosophy and 
his unconventional style of writing is important. I will in the following argue that this 
question is the Achilles heel of the so called ‘community view’ readings of Wittgenstein. 
It could perhaps even be said that the question of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards 
philosophy has been the problem that has caused most difficulties for readings of PI. We 
will in the following see that this is just what the problem is for both Kripke’s and 
Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein. 
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What role does publicity have in rule-following? 
2 The background of the Wright-McDowell debate 
The papers we will be looking at are McDowell’s “Wittgenstein on following a rule” and 
Wright’s “Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mind: sensation, privacy, and intention”.3  
One of the most important targets of Wittgenstein’s attacks is the philosophical 
propensity for a Platonistic account of language. This much is fairly uncontroversial in 
the exegetical literature. What is controversial is what dialectical role his attacks play. 
What, if any, alternative does Wittgenstein indirectly point to in his attack? All the 
alternatives insist on the “publicity of language”. McDowell summarizes the 
disagreement in the question of “how does Wittgenstein’s insistence on publicity 
emerge?” To understand Wright and McDowell we have to first take a look at Kripke.  
Kripke 
A good starting point for examining the differences is with their disagreement over 
Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein and especially his reading of the so called is right/seems 
right problem. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein gave a sceptical argument by showing 
the impossibility of following rules in language.  And since having a language is to follow 
rules, this threatens the foundations of a theory of language. 
The main passage for Kripke is the first paragraph of §201: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The 
answer was; if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it 
can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict. 
An example: I take my little sister to the library to teach her the difference between 
hardback and paperback books. I show her a deluxe edition of Kant’s first critique and 
                                                 
3 McDowell (McDowell, John. “Wittgenstein on following a rule” in Mind, value and reality, 221-262. 
Cambridge, London and Harvard: University Press, 1998.), page 260. Wright (Wright, Crispin. “Kripke's 
account of the argument against private language”. The Journal of Philosophy, (1984): 759–778.). 
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say “this is a hardback book”; and then show her a Penguin Classics edition of Kant’s 
first critique and say “this is a paperback”. Then she points at several books and 
categorizes them correctly until she finds a copy of Bukowski’s “The post office”. This 
particular copy is a paperback, but the cover has been given a thick and stiff coat of 
plastic by the library. My sister puts this book in the hardcover category, even though it 
clearly is a cheap Penguin Classics edition. I would say this mistake was a result of her 
interpreting my instructions wrongly. But she could reply that her interpretation of the 
rule I told her about is better than mine, because the book does have a hard cover. So we 
have a situation where the only way we could decide which interpretation of the rule is 
correct, is by appealing to another interpretation. And an infinite regress seems 
unavoidable. The same can be said of the rule for the use of any other word.4
According to Kripke, Wittgenstein’s answer to this sceptical argument is a sceptical 
solution. There is no proper response that refutes the sceptical argument, so we will have 
to do with the only alternative left, a sceptical solution. Kripke’s sceptical solution 
consists of, according to McDowell, two points. The first is that “we must reform our 
intuitive conception of meaning, replacing the notion of truth-conditions with some 
notion like that of justification conditions.”5 The second is that we avoid linguistic 
anarchy by only accepting other people into the linguistic community when we have 
reasons to believe they use words in the same way as us. Or, to put the point in a 
common-sensical way, if we can make sense of what they say, then we suppose, until it is 
otherwise proven, that we use words in the same ways. Kripke is, in other words, not 
saying that we have normativity only that we call something “right”.  
Kripke’s argument is intriguing enough on its own terms, but as both Wright and 
McDowell point out, it is clearly at odds with PI.6 We need not look further than the rest 
                                                 
4 Dr. Marie McGinn pointed out to me that this example might not preserve Wittgenstein's intentions would 
not use such a common-sensical example. He would probably prefer to use as an example a case where 
doubt would not normally arise, a case where only a philosophical sceptic would question the result.  The 
reason it might not preserve Wittgenstein intentions is that Wittgenstein would probably prefer to also 
operate with a philosophically innocent notion of rule-following. The example in question might be seen as 
such a philosophically innocent example of rule-following, whereas what Wittgenstein wants to attack is a 
philosophically laden notion of rule-following. I do support such a reading of a Wittgenstein, but I will 
leave the discussion for later. 
5 McDowell, “Wittgenstein on following a rule”, 227. This is one of the main points of Wright’s essay 
“Kripke’s account of the private language argument”. 
6 Ibid., 229. 
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of §201 to see strong indications that Wittgenstein’s hint at a solution is not a hint at a 
sceptical solution: 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that 
in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; (…). 
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, (…). 
The sceptical paradox rests on a misunderstanding. And what it shows is that there must 
be ‘grasping of rules’ without interpretation, by the way of something like a reduction ad 
absurdum. (The reductio argument being that language is governed by rules, yet rules 
cannot be a foundation for normativity because there can always be given at least two 
interpretation of any rule.) What Wittgenstein gives us as his alternative are the enigmatic 
remarks that “… also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.” (§202); and that “I have been trained 
to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.” (§198)  
According to Kripke, Wittgenstein gave us two alternatives. The first option is that of a 
platonistic account of language but this option, considering Wittgenstein’s criticism, is no 
longer a viable option. The only other alternative, says Kripke, is a sceptical solution. 
However unsatisfying, it is, what we will have to do with. We have a two-horn dilemma 
and we choose the least unsatisfactory option. Both Wright and McDowell deny that this 
seemingly unavoidable dilemma represents the only two alternatives.  The third option is 
rejecting the hidden premise Wittgenstein hints at when he says “It can be seen that there 
is a misunderstanding here…” So, McDowell says, “there are three positions in play: the 
two horns of the dilemma, and the community-oriented conception of meaning that 
enables us to decline the choice.”7 Exactly what role the community plays, and how it 
enables us to avoid the dilemma, is what McDowell and Wright disagree on. 
The is right/seems right problem is discussed in two different ways at different points in 
the PI.  The first is in § 201, and the second is in the paragraphs surrounding 258 
(commonly known as the Private Language Argument). Kripke puts the emphasis on the 
attack Wittgenstein makes on the rule-following picture as he puts it in §201. The 
normativity of words cannot be grounded in interpretation of rules since a rule can always 
be interpreted in at least two ways. A similar attack is found in §258 where the reader is 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 243. 
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asked to imagine a situation where someone names a recurring sensation by concentrating 
on the sensation and giving it a name. The purpose of this naming is of course to 
remember the connection right in the future. Wittgenstein then asks how we can be so 
sure that we do remember the connection rightly. What guarantees do we have that we do 
not misjudge that it is the same sensation that reappears on a later occasion? Since my 
memory is the only thing I can appeal to, there is no guarantee that my memory will not 
deceive me. 
The result of the argument is that establishing some kind of ‘official rule’ or issuing a 
‘linguistic decree’ about what a word means will get us no where because we always 
could misremember the word without noticing our mistake. The argument of §201 is 
similarly that it is useless issuing a ‘linguistic decree’ because it can always be interpreted 
in at least two different ways. There are certainly important differences between the 
arguments of §§ 201 and 258, but those will not be discussed here because the conclusion 
of the essay does not depend on it. This short comparison will be sufficient as we enter 
into the discussion between Wright and McDowell. 
3 Wright’s view 
There is, unfortunately, not room for an extensive survey of Wright’s point of view. The 
reading of Wright will only be as detailed as is necessary to understand McDowell’s 
critique, so as to understand McDowell’s own positive view. We will be concentrating on 
the essay “Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mind: Sensation, privacy, and intention”8 
and not the book “Wittgenstein on the foundations of the philosophy of mathematics”.9 
Even though tracing the development and change of Wright’s thought would be 
interesting on its own, it will have to be postponed to another occasion.  
Wright approaches the is right/seems right problem from a different angle than Kripke. 
Wright’s paper is mainly concerned with discussing such topics as the ‘infallibility thesis’ 
about judgements of inner states and its consequences for the is right/seems right 
                                                 
8 Wright pages 631-633. (Wright, Crispin. “Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, 
and Intention”. The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (1989): 622-634.) 
9 Wright, Crispin. “Wittgenstein on the foundations of mathematics”. Duckworth: London, 1980 
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problem. The ‘infallibility thesis’ is that, since we have ‘direct’ access to our intentional 
states,10 it seems quite probable that we should err less in our judgements about our own 
intentional states than in judgements we make using our senses. Wright discusses whether 
a weakening of the infallibility thesis might leave the is right/seems right problem 
innocuous. The idea being that, if we refrain from claiming that we have infallible access 
to knowledge about our intentional states, then cases of misremembering would be less of 
a problem for a theory of language. And, hence, the is right/seems right problem would be 
built on a false intuition, namely that we always the ’know’ our intentional states. We 
shall not spend time on the details of that argument but concentrate on what is about 
Wright’s view of language that he believes enables him to avoid the is right/seems right 
problem. 
One of the most basic philosophical puzzles about intentional states is that 
they seem to straddle two paradigms: the paradigm of sensation (…) and the 
paradigm of psychological characteristics…11
The deceptive premise that generates this puzzle is the idea 
…that there has to be a substantial epistemology of intentional states, a 
mode of cognitive access to those states which is distinctively available to 
their subject and which is somehow able to measure up to the epistemic 
security with which sincere avowals of intentional states are standardly 
credited.12
Wright does not take up to discussion the question whether we have a first person 
authority over judgements about our own intentional states or not. Rather, he questions 
how easily we turn this intuitive idea into detailed theories about how it can be that we 
have this ‘complete and infallible authority’. It is this propensity towards a substantial 
epistemology of intentional states that is the target Wittgenstein’s attacks, according to 
Wright. 
Ratification dependence  
Wright never gives a detailed definition of what a ‘substantial epistemology of intentional 
states’ is. His first sketchy attempt is that: “A subject’s sincere dispositions of avowal – 
                                                 
10 Let, for the moment, this problematic notion pass. It will be discussed later. 
11 Wright, “Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind”, 631. 
12 Ibid., 631. 
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or, better, his beliefs – would stand by default, unless there was positive reason to reject 
them.”13 Wright mentions two reasons for sometimes the disbelieving someone's 
believes. The first is a two part criterion. 1a: “…the inability of the intentional system so 
determined to rationalize his [own] behaviour satisfyingly” together with 1b: “…the 
ability of an alternative system, generated by discarding the suspect ascriptions,…” to 
rationalize his own behaviour in a more satisfying manner. A second type of reason 
“might be provided by internal constraints of harmony and intelligibility working within 
the system as a whole.”14
Wright does not give an example of how this might work, but we could try to think of one 
for him. An example of the first type of reason could be: Let’s say Mr Sinclair is looking 
at Meredith Williams’ book on Wittgenstein and says to himself: “I really like that 
yellow”. An example of the first type of reasons could be: Sinclair suddenly remembers 
that he showed the book to his friend Mr Sheridan the other day and recalls that he at that 
time called the colour of the book “orange”. So he now knows he has an inconsistency in 
his belief system. So he adjusts his use of “yellow” and “orange” and decides that the 
book is yellow. A dark orange-like shade of yellow. An example of the second type of 
reasons would be if Mr Sinclair showed the book to Ms Ivanova and told her “I really like 
this yellow”. If Mr Sheridan at that moment walked in the door he would say “But 
yesterday you told me that the colour of the book was orange”. Then Mr Sinclair would 
have to adjust his use of the words “yellow” and “orange”, and we have an example of the 
second type. 
To understand why Wright brings in the concept of ratification-dependence, to understand 
what weakness it is meant to mend, we need to take a step back and take a look at the big 
picture.  
Wright believes that patterns in language, i.e. rules for how to use words, are ratification-
dependent. That means that our use of any words is subject to ratification by other 
language users, which is at philosophical way of saying that other language users can 
correct us if we use a word incorrectly. Wright believes that we, by allowing for words to 
be ratification-dependent, can avoid the is right/seems right problem. Since other people 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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will correct us if we use a word incorrectly, we now have a way of distinguishing between 
actually following a rule and merely seeming to oneself to do so and the is right/seems 
right problem is no longer a threat. It is because the community of language users is given 
such an important role that we might call Wright’s view a ‘community view’. An 
important difference from Kripke’s account is that Wright sets out to ”save normativity”, 
whereas Kripke’s sceptical solution only describes the situation and he does not intend to 
”save” anything.  
Such a theory of ratification-dependence seems to be begging the question of how words 
for private experiences are possible. Such words seem to be clear counter-examples to the 
coherency of the insistence on ratification-dependence. Wright can, of course, not allow 
for any exception of words for private experiences if he wants to ‘salvage’ language as we 
know it. But, an objection might go, it seems quite counter intuitive that other people are 
in a position to correct my use of words that, per se require a first person perspective - 
words for ‘private’ states ‘happy’, ‘melancholic’, ‘distressed’, etc. One might say: “Only I 
know what kind of emotions I have, and therefore it does not make any sense say that 
other people could possibly know what I really meant when they think I used a word 
incorrectly.” 
This is what Wright’s denial of “substantial epistemology of intentional states” is meant 
to correct. Wright argues that we are misleading ourselves when we believe we can pick 
out and refer to intentional states as something clearly demarcated. One of the targets of 
Wittgenstein’s argumentation is, according to Wright, the idea that we have a substantial 
epistemology for intentional states. If we abandon this idea, then the temptation to appeal 
to private rule-following disappears alongside it. The thought is that if we reject the idea 
that we can point at clearly demarcated private intentional states, then we would not have 
any private ‘things’ the baptismal intentions build on. And others to not need to have 
access to anything ‘private’ to be able to correct us.  
Wright wants to replace the idea that we have a substantial epistemology of intentional 
states with a much weaker conception where “the authority standardly credited to a 
subject’s own beliefs, or expressed avowals, about his intentional states are a constitutive 
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principle…”.15 The constitutive principle “…enters primitively into the conditions of 
identification of what a subject believes, hopes, and intends” and is not something that is 
“a by-product of the nature of those states”.16 So, yes I am by default in a better position 
to identify my beliefs, intentions, etc., than others, but what I ‘identify’ are not clearly 
demarcated states. And, consequently, when Wright says that our language is ratification 
dependent, he does not have to say that others are accessing my (private) states.  Because 
not even I ‘access’ my own experiences.  
Thus Wright hopes to avoid the is right/seems right problem by emphasising the 
ratification-dependence of language. At the same time he allows for a first person 
authority over utterances about ones ‘inner’ life while denying that these indicate that we 
could have a substantial epistemology of intentional states. 
4 Critique of Wright  
So, McDowell says, “there are three positions in play: the two horns of the dilemma, and 
the community-oriented conception of meaning that enables us to decline the choice.” 
Kripke sees no other alternatives than the two horns of the dilemma: 1 no interpretation is 
authoritative because a rule can always be interpreted at least two ways, so we end up 
with linguistic anarchy, 2 or we could go for a Platonistic explanation of rules in 
language. Wright correctly saw that Wittgenstein wants us to decline the choice and find a 
third of alternative that does not rest on the same premise that make both of Kripke's 
alternatives wrong. So far McDowell agrees with Wright. But, he argues, that Wright, to 
save the coherency of his theory, has to deny a strong intuition about correctness. And in 
denying this intuition he makes normativity in language impossible. We shall see that 
there are strong reasons, not only exegetical but also argumentative, to reject Wright’s 
theory. 
To backup his claim that Wright does not save normativity, McDowell rewrites §406 of 
PI as follows: 
                                                 
15 Ibid. Wright’s own italics. 
16 Ibid. 
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Could the justification of an action as fulfilment of an order run like this: 
“You said ‘Bring me a yellow flower’, upon which the picking of this one 
received approval from all the bystanders; that is why I have brought it”? 
Wouldn’t one have to reply: “But I didn’t set you to bring the flower which 
should receive approval from everyone else after what I said!”?17
Where Wright seems to assume that there is little difference between meaning and 
consensus, McDowell tries to drive a wedge in between the two. The thrust of this 
argument relies on appealing to the untenability of rejecting the intuition that, if 
something is correct, then it is correct regardless of what other people say. Something is 
correct or incorrect regardless of how many people believe so. The implausibility might 
be even clearer if we rewrite §460 to be parallel to the example of §185 where the pupil 
has to complete the series of numbers. So, the pupil could say, 
“You said ‘Write down a series of on numbers of the form 0, n, 1n, 2n, 3n, 
etc where n is +1”; upon which the series ‘0, 1, 2, 3, 4 etc’ received approval 
from all the bystanders; that is why I wrote it that way”? Wouldn’t one have 
to reply: “But I didn’t set you to complete the series which should receive 
approval from everyone else after what I said!”? 
So when the pupil write 1004, 1008, etc he will not receive approval from the bystanders. 
But Wright would have to say that if enough people agree with the pupil, then he is right. 
What is correct and not only depends on whether a majority thinks so or not. 
There are both strong exegetical and argumentative reasons to say, with McDowell, that: 
“…it would be a serious error (…) not to make a radical distinction between the 
significance of, say, “This is yellow” and the significance of, say, “This would be called 
‘yellow’ by (most) speakers of English”.18 We will first discuss whether Wright is 
committed to denying such a distinction and what coherency problems it might result in. 
Then we will look at some of the exegetical reasons for rejecting such a view. 
                                                 
17 McDowell, 234. Wittgenstein’s original §460 is: “Could the justification of an action as fulfilment of an 
order run like this: “You said ‘Bring me a yellow flower’, upon which this one [i.e. a yellow flower] gave 
me a feeling of satisfaction; that is why I have brought it”? Wouldn’t one have to reply: “But I didn’t set 
you to bring the flower which should give you that sort of feeling after what I said!”?” 
18 Ibid. 
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Argumentative reasons 
First, let’s take a closer look at how McDowell’s yellow flower example is an argument 
against Wright. Wright might object that all he said was that we must allow for correcting 
each other, not that we must have a referendum when making up new words. Perhaps we 
could say that one person could do the baptising, and then others might correct him if he, 
in the future, should loose his grip on his baptismal intentions. Unfortunately, such a 
scenario seems plausible only on an assumption Wright is not entitled to make. We can 
only make sense of Wright’s theory when we already have a language there. We can only 
envisage how his alternative might work if we take as a starting point the normativity 
there actually is in language; a normativity Wright’s theory cannot explain. Wright’s 
alternative makes good sense only if the scenarios in which we picture in his theory 
applied are taken from everyday situations, and he gets into trouble if we imagine more 
extreme circumstances. If we try to get Wright’s theory started in a setting where there is 
no language to build upon, then it is at best unclear how  
…Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein has the means to make it intelligible that 
there should so much as be such an action as calling an object “yellow”.19
Wright never says that we must only use situations from everyday life when envisaging 
his proposal. This requirement is not an integral part of Wright’s theory, but the problem 
is that, without it, it is on collision course with some strong intuitions we have about 
language. We will look at two the examples of how much Wright’s theory rests on an 
assumption he is not entitled to make.  
Crusoe 
Let us imagine a person that for some reason is cut off from contact with other humans 
(and newspapers, radio, etc) for a long period of time. Like Robinson Crusoe. Since Mr 
Crusoe is no less prone to conceptual recidivism20 than the rest of us, he is bound to 
sooner or later misremember the baptismal intentions behind, for example, “yellow”. He 
could start classifying some shades of orange as yellows. If we assume he stays alone for 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 235 
20 Wright, “Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind”, 628. ”Conceptual recidivism is, evidently, merely a 
special case of a more general possibility: departures from the system of concepts enshrined in the linguist’s 
original practice may take all kinds of, perhaps unprecedented, directions.” 
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decades, then this could happen with a range of words. Wright’s explanation would be 
that this happens because there is nobody there to correct Crusoe’s incorrect use of words. 
The question now becomes how we diagnose what is happening to Crusoe’s language. Is 
his language changing or is it dissolving? The common-sensical answer would be that his 
language is changing. Wright, on the other hand, is forced to say that it is dissolving 
because he grounds meaning in communal assent.21 Without community there is no 
normativity and without normativity there is no language. Wright is therefore obliged to 
contradict the strong intuition that Crusoe’s language is only changing and not 
deteriorating and dissolving. 
The reason this is not evident in Wright’s text is that his argumentation tacitly rests on the 
help it gets from the fact that we picture such correction happening in a setting where 
language is already there. The thought experiments is argument calls for seem reasonable 
because we imagine them in a normal setting where we have an established language. 
Furthermore, he believes that to admit that Crusoe’s ‘new language’ has normativity 
would be to play the ball directly in to the arms of the private linguist. For Wright, ones 
own (private) baptismal intentions do not ground the meaning of a word. Only the 
community’s assent of my use of a word grounds its meaning. In Crusoe’s case there no 
longer is a community and that, for Wright, becomes a problem when Crusoe loses sight 
of his original baptismal intentions. Because it seems that a solitary language user 
indicates that private languages are possible.  
We could explain the same point using a metaphor: We could imagine, using words in the 
same way as other people, as something much like marching in line with them. Then our 
challenge for Wright would be what he could say if somebody is marching all alone. 
Would it no longer be marching? Or rather, would it no longer be rhythmical walking? 
Would it be random stomping? The challenge for Wright is: If Crusoe experiences 
conceptual-recidivism, are all of a sudden his words just random noises? Wright would of 
course answer the question in the negative. It is too obviously wrong. But what then are 
                                                 
21 Kripke says we “sign a contract” saying we will use words the same way as other. Wright weakens this 
position by saying that we are generally right, and the only thing the community does is to correct our 
occasional mistakes. 
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these ‘new words’? Wright would probably not deny that Crusoe’s ‘new words’ are words 
in some way. 
Maybe he could appeal to the psychological stability of the human mind and say that a 
massive breakdown of language would take a too long time so as to be observed. Crusoe 
would not experience conceptual recidivism on a big enough scale to make it a significant 
counterexample. This rebuttal misses the point. It is meaning, it is normativity, Wright 
grounds in communal assent. What is at stake for Wright is not whether Crusoe’s 
language might be changing or not, but whether Crusoe even makes sense to himself, 
when he uses a ‘new word’. Wright, to be consistent has to say that without communal 
assent, there is no normativity, and without normativity there is no language, and without 
language we cannot be making sense even to ourselves. If we want to keep hold of the 
intuition that Crusoe’s language is only changing, and not dissolving, we will have to 
look for other alternatives than Wright’s theory. 
The reason this is not obvious on first sight when reading Wright is that his theory, 
probably unintentionally, exploits a gap between the theory in itself and how we picture it 
playing out. If we try to see before our inner eye, a situation where a person correct 
someone else’s conceptual-recidivism, then we unconsciously take a normal situation, 
where there already is language, as our starting point. And we have no problem 
whatsoever seeing the situation play out before our inner eye. The problem is that Wright 
is not justified in using, as examples corroborating his theory, situations where there 
already is normativity, since his theory concerns the very foundations of normativity, and 
not just the correction of mere mistakes. 
New words  
If using a Robinson Crusoe as an example seems a bit far-fetched, we have a parallel 
problem closer to our everyday life. When Crusoe started using a word in a new way, i.e. 
really making up a new word, he would still be able to explain his new use. This means 
that there is some regularity, i.e. normativity, to the new use. It is not just a random noise. 
The same could be said of people that are not isolated on an island, people that are in a 
situation where they could be corrected by others. If I, for example, all of a sudden started 
classifying shades of orange with the yellows I would be able to explain that new use. My 
utterance would not all of a sudden the nothing but a noise. So there is some normativity 
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there.  
While it is quite clear that Wright would say that a Crusoe who has suffered conceptual-
recidivism no longer has a language, he would still maintain that a word that has 
undergone conceptual-recidivism is still a word. At least they must stay words for a 
while, since it only makes sense to say that other people might correct my incorrect use of 
a word if they recognize it as a word. Furthermore, conceptual-recidivism is never 
completely random. The ‘new’ word has a close resemblance to the ‘old’ word. If I 
experience conceptual-recidivism and start using a word in a peculiar way, it would of 
course be inconvenient since it would result in misunderstandings. But the intuition we 
have, at least most of us, is that the peculiar use of some sound combination would still be 
a word. It would be a word, not a random noise. So there is some normativity behind any 
‘new’ word. 
This means that the question Wright needs to answer is the same as in the case of Crusoe: 
is Wright’s ‘communal meaning’ really ‘meaning’ at all? If normativity in language, i.e. 
meaning, is nothing but communal assent, then what should we say about our intuition 
that Crusoe’s language is only changing and not dissolving? What should we say about 
our intuition that a ‘new’ (use of) a word only means we are wrong, not that the word is 
dissolving into random noise? 
Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein seems unable to cope with these questions. Wright’s 
alternative does not have the means to explain normativity and so we have Argumentative 
reasons for believing that Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein is wrong. 
Exegetical reasons 
We have looked at the coherency of Wright’s views as they stand on their own. Now we 
will look briefly at a few exegetical reasons for believing Wright is wrong.22 Perhaps the 
best indication that Wright is on the wrong track is §241: 
                                                 
22 Wright has also openly expressed doubt about whether Wittgenstein’s intention of not doing positive 
philosophy be abandoned. See pages 244-246 of Wright, Crispin. “Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following 
Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics” in Reflections on Chomsky, edited by A. 
George, 133-164. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. I found this quote in  Minar: Feeling at home in language; 
footnote 10 on page 419. 
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So are you saying that human agreement decides what is true and false?” –It 
is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. 
For Wright the concept of ‘form of life’ seems to be little more than publicly expressed 
opinions with a sufficiently great number of adherents as to take on a foundational 
character. Such a conception of ‘form of life’ misses the radicality of Wittgenstein’s idea. 
Agreement in opinions does not convert into a foundation. That ‘form of life’ is more 
than convergence in opinions is also the point of the following quote from 
“Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics”: 
…it has often been put in the form of an assertion that the truths of logic are 
determined by consensus of opinions. Is this what I am saying? No. There is 
no opinion at all; it is not a question of opinion. They are determined by 
consensus of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the 
same way. There is a consensus but it us not a consensus of opinion. We all 
act the same way, walk the same way, count the same way.23
Similarly, the point of Zettel24 §431 is that opinion polls cannot be used in establishing 
the meaning of a word: 
Does human agreement decide what is red? Is it decided by appeal to the 
majority? Were we taught to determine colour in that way? 
For Wittgenstein ‘form of life’ is the common ground we humans have from where we 
can go in different directions. It is because we have a framework that we can have 
different opinions, not the other way around. 
No dispute breaks out over the question whether a proceeding was according 
to the rule or not. It doesn’t come to blows for example. 
 
This belongs to the framework, out of which our language works (for 
example, gives a description).25
                                                 
23 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein's lectures on the foundation of mathematics, Cambridge 1939, notes 
by R. G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and Y. Smythies. Edited by Cora Diamond. Ithaca and New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1976. Pages 183-184. 
24 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Zettel. Edited G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. 
Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967.  
25 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the foundations of mathematics, Revised edition. Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978. § VI-21 (page 323). Quoted by Minar in (Minar, Edward H. ”Wittgenstein 
and the ”contingency” of community”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 72 (1991): 203-234) page 225. 
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Several more passages of Wittgenstein’s writings could be given to show that Wright’s 
reading is at odds with Wittgenstein’s intentions. But it is more fruitful to try and 
understand what Wittgenstein did mean, than what he did not mean. 
5 Uncovering McDowell’s positive view 
In this essay I have chosen to concentrate on the four essays by McDowell that 
correspond to chapters 11 through 14 in the book “Mind, value and reality”.  Those essays 
where or originally published between 1984 and 1993. Of those essays I have chosen to 
focus on the earliest one, “Wittgenstein on following a rule”, because is this essay that 
deals directly with Wright. So when I in the following say ”according to McDowell”, or 
something like it, I will mostly be speaking of this essay, unless otherwise noted. This is 
important because, as we shall see, McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein has changed over 
time. McDowell’s later papers are closer to what I believe is a correct reading of 
Wittgenstein, and also what I take to be Minar’s reading of Wittgenstein. But, as it is the 
essay from 1984 that McDowell’s disagreement with Wright is most thoroughly 
discussed, this is the essay that will be the focus in the following.  
McDowell, in the essay from 1984, repeatedly insists that: “Wright makes nothing of 
Wittgenstein’s concern – which figures at the centre of my reading – to attack the 
assimilation of understanding to interpretation.”26 If we give this point due attention we 
both avoid the problems of Wright’s view and arrive at a far more enlightening 
interpretation of Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, giving an account of McDowell’s own 
positive view is not as easy as we might hope. McDowell seems to assume that we see his 
positive view in his critique; and so he does not say much other than as a critique of 
Wright. The best way of exploring McDowell’s positive view is therefore to look at his 
diagnosis of what leads Wright astray. Hence we have to uncover rather than just 
recapitulating McDowell's arguments.  
What complicates matters is that McDowell, in a later paper, admits that he is no longer 
satisfied with the paper from 1984, where his main concern is to criticize Wright: 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 261. 
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Commentators often suggest that the concept of a custom and its cognates 
figure in Wittgenstein as elements in a constructive philosophical response 
to questions like “How is meaning possible?” According to some versions of 
this reading, Wittgenstein actually gives the response; according to others, 
he points towards it but does not give it, out of a quietism that must stand 
exposed as inappropriate by the sheer fact that the questions are 
(supposedly) good ones. I am committed to regarding this as a misreading. 
[In a footnote to this paragraph he adds:] I now think Essay 11 above [the 
one we will be discussing] is too hospitable to this kind of reading.27
So, while making sense of McDowell’s few positive remarks, we will have to keep in 
mind his later view. Firstly we will look at his diagnosis of what goes wrong in Wright’s 
view and from that say something about McDowell’s own view. Then we will try to pin 
down what he later became dissatisfied with. Finally we will adjust McDowell’s view, so 
as to accommodate for his concessions, using Edward H. Minar’s writings on 
Wittgenstein. 
McDowell’s diagnosis of Wright’s problem 
Of all the topics that could have been discussed under this heading, only two will be 
discussed. These two are the assimilation of understanding with interpretation and 
Wright’s anti-realism. McDowell believes these two are closely connected and that most 
of the other smaller problems in Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein  stem from these. So, 
although we have already seen reasons for rejecting Wright’s views, we need to take a 
look at what McDowell believes sends the right in the wrong direction, so as to 
understand McDowell’s own view.  
Understanding as interpretation 
Both McDowell and Wright agree that Kripke misses an essential point in his reading of 
§201. This is where Wittgenstein, after stating the rule-following paradox, goes on to say 
that, the presence of a paradox, shows that we are making a mistake. 
This was our paradox; no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because any course of action can be made out to accord with a rule. (…) 
 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that 
in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if 
                                                 
27 McDowell, “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy”, 275. 
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each one contended us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another 
one standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a 
rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 
“obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases. (§201) 
 
Wright uses the first half of the second paragraph of §201 as an argument against Kripke. 
Wittgenstein cannot be giving a sceptical solution because he openly says that the 
paradox rests on a misunderstanding. Oddly enough Wright never expends much energy 
on explaining what he believes Wittgenstein could have meant by the last sentence of the 
same paragraph - that there must be a way of grasping a rule, which is not an 
interpretation. Instead of spending time on Wittgenstein’s slightly mysterious remark, 
Wright suggests that what leads to the paradox is our alleged craving for a “substantial 
epistemology of intentional states”. It is not clear why Wright chooses not pursue 
Wittgenstein’s own hint at a solution. Why he does not spend more than a parenthesis on 
Wittgenstein’s quick and sketchy answer but instead goes through all the trouble of 
denying we have a substantial epistemology of inner states, proposing ‘the constitutive 
principle’ as a replacement, etc. According to McDowell it is Wright’s anti-realist stance 
that is to blame.28
Anti-realism 
Giving a full exposition of Wright’s and McDowell’s considerations of the realism/anti-
realism debate is beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes a short summary of the 
most relevant points will have to suffice.  
According to McDowell, the anti-realist view of language, claims that belonging to a 
linguistic community is nothing more than having matching exteriors. The anti-realist 
cannot appeal to anything beyond the surface. Because, if being an anti-realist is believing 
that we cannot ‘reach out to’ objects, then whatever description we give of the object in 
question, it cannot be more than one possible interpretation. If all we have is the surface, 
then there will inevitably be more than one interpretation. 
                                                 
28 McDowell, “Wittgenstein on following a rule”, 247 and 262. 
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A better option for McDowell is having a “non-anti-realism”29 about meaning. This 
means that a 
…shared command of a language equips us to know one another’s meaning 
without needing to arrive at that knowledge by interpretation, because it 
equips us to hear someone else’s meaning in his words.30
Since McDowell is not committed to anti-realism, he is comfortable appealing to ‘the 
meaning itself” whenever Wright would have to resort to interpretation. So what 
McDowell believes he accomplishes by discarding Wright’s anti-realism is obvious 
enough. Another question is whether the argument is convincing. McDowell never 
explains in detail what he means by “hearing someone else’s meaning in his words”. So it 
seems that he assumes the correctness of this assumption on the basis that it is the 
opposite of the anti-realist view, which he has shown to be wrong. But if McDowell is 
simply stating how things must be, that we do hear the meaning in each others words, he 
is simply asserting his position. Some, may be for example Wright, might think that he by 
this simply is begging the question. What McDowell, on the other hand, probably intends 
to do is to reject (§§128 and 133) the question. We will shortly look at those questions 
McDowell’s argument seems to be begging; and farther down try to explain what the 
difference between ‘begging the question’ and ‘rejecting a question’ is. 
Summary of McDowell’s view 
What in McDowell’s view is it then that puts him in a better position to say how 
understanding can be something other than interpretation? What about his non-anti-realist 
conception of a linguistic community is it that is different from Wright’s anti-realist 
conception? McDowell says: 
In the different picture I have described, the response to Wittgenstein’s 
problem works because a linguistic community is conceived as bound 
together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to just anyone), 
but by a capacity for a meeting of minds.31
                                                 
29 Ibid., 253. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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McDowell never explains what a “meeting of minds” is and we might wonder why since 
it hardly is self-explanatory. One reason might be that he just has not worked out the 
details yet. A more probable explanation is that he simply believes it is an explanation 
good enough and that nothing is missing. That Wittgenstein has an outspoken ‘anti-
philosophical-theses’ stance, makes this the most probable explanation for McDowell’s 
silence. If so, we could take McDowell as saying that, when we discard the anti-realist’s 
insistence on only describing the linguistic community by ‘mere externals’, then we can 
see that having a language is the “capacity for a meeting of minds”. Or, in other words, 
once we get rid of the anti-realism we can be happy with the common-sensical 
explanation that “I understand what you are saying”. The assumption seems to be that, 
since the anti-realist only has externals to deal with, he will always have interpretation. 
Such a reading is supported by the last paragraph of McDowell’s paper: 
… makes it impossible for Wright to accommodate for Wittgenstein’s 
insistence that understanding need not be interpretation – is the anti-realist 
conception of our knowledge of others.32
Without the anti-realist need for looking at understanding in terms of interpretation we are 
free to accept explanations of normativity in language that do not use the notion of 
interpretation. McDowell, of course, has a proposal. It is that “obeying a rule is a 
practice”.33 We hear the meaning in words, without interpretation, because of the 
“‘custom’/’practice’/’institution’ that is language”.34 For McDowell publicity enters the 
picture as the place where we in fact do have normativity in language. Wright, on the 
other hand, brings in publicity to mend a (anti-realist) theory of how normativity in 
language is possible. McDowell does not ‘add’ publicity to his theory “oils the wheels 
and produces” normativity. He points at the public nature of natural language and says: 
this is where there is normativity and we do not need any explanation in non-normative 
terms to ‘save’ it. Wright is right that it is in publicity that we find normativity, but only 
accidentally right. McDowell believes that Wright asks the wrong question, because 1. He 
is an anti-realist, and therefore ends up looking for the wrong answer in the right place; 2. 
He looks for a constructive account of how normativity in language is possible. He this on 
the right airport but on the wrong plane.  
                                                 
32 Ibid., 262. 
33 Ibid., 239 . 
34 Ibid., 242. 
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Wright ends up with a conception of community that does not have the means to explain 
normativity. Wright, correctly, believed that there cannot be normativity in a private 
language. He then, not all that different from Kripke, assumed that Wittgenstein’s point 
was that seeing language as ‘mass rule-following’, we could explain where normativity 
enters the picture. It is essentially the same problem the private linguist has, that plagues 
Wright’s ‘community view’. In the case of private languages the problem was that 
“whatever is going to seems right to me is right”. (§258) In the case of Wright the 
problem is that: “Whatever is going to seem right to us is right.”35 The Achilles heel of 
Wright’s reading is that it goes against the intuition that something is not right only 
because a lot of people say so. 
McDowell and Wright agree on the importance of ‘publicity’ in understanding language. 
But they disagree on how the publicity of language enters into consideration. 
“‘But if Wittgenstein’s position is the one I have described in this section, it 
is precisely the notion of a communal practice that is needed, and not some 
notion that could equally be applied outside the context of a community. The 
essential point is the way in which one person can know another’s meaning 
without interpretation.36
Unfortunately, problems arise when we try to spell out what it might mean that we can 
“know another’s meaning without interpretation”. 
The problems 
If we attempt to specify what it is to say that “one person can know another’s meaning 
without interpretation”, there seem to be two slightly different paths we could follow. 
The first would be that Wittgenstein simply asserts that it is in community that 
normativity is established. We need to just maintain, in the face of the repeated questions 
by sceptics of the common-sensical, that there indeed is normativity in our everyday use 
of language. Any search for a further foundation will be fruitless because we do not need 
anything other than our everyday use of language to explain normativity. Such a way of 
                                                 
35 McDowell says this in a footnote on page 255. 
36 Ibid., 254. 
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specifying what the early McDowell says, gives Wittgenstein’s notion of community a 
positive role to be played. 
The similar, yet importantly diverging way of specifying McDowell’s view, would be to 
emphasize that it is the search for a foundation of language that leads us astray. Yes, 
normativity in language is ‘provided’ by the community,37 but Wittgenstein is not giving 
‘the community’ as an answer to the search for a foundation for normativity in language. 
On this alternative reading the rhetorical role of ‘community’ (or ‘publicity’) is that of 
dissuading the reader from looking for a mechanism behind language as what ‘generates’ 
its normativity. On this reading the notion of community has only a rhetorical role in an 
argument against something, not a constructive and assertive one as in the first 
alternative. 
It is not clear which of these options the early McDowell favoured and this vagueness is 
what creates problems. McDowell seems to believe that his arguments does the 
philosophical work sketched in the second alternative, however the wording of the 
arguments themselves lend themselves more towards the first alternative. The differences 
between these readings might seem trivial, but as we shall see in section five, they reveal 
a gap in McDowell’s reading of PI. At the beginning of this chapter four, we quoted a 
later essay by McDowell where, with regards to the question ‘How is meaning possible’ 
he says that:  
According to some versions of this reading, Wittgenstein actually gives the 
response; according to others, he points towards it but does not give it, out 
of a quietism that must stand exposed as inappropriate by the sheer fact that 
the questions are (supposedly) good ones. I am committed to regarding this 
as a misreading.38
McDowell’s alternative to Wright, in the essay we have been looking at, seems to assume 
that the question “How is meaning possible” is a good question. Or, more modestly, it is 
at least not clear that McDowell could explain, to his adversaries, why it is a bad question. 
At least, saying that Wright is answering the question “how is normativity possible” in the 
wrong way, seems to be an indirect acceptance of the question. The early McDowell does 
                                                 
37 “Provided” by the community (the sum of people in a specific area) meaning “as opposed to provided by 
a governmental committee, a professor of linguistics, my own ostensive definitions, etc”. 
38 McDowell, “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy”, 275. 
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not clearly enough distance himself from an idea such as that “the only thesis 
Wittgenstein allows us to have, and it is the thesis that our ordinary language does not 
need a foundation for the normativity it exhibits”, so as to remove all doubt that this is not 
what he thinks. This is probably one of the things the later McDowell wanted to correct. 
This is indeed close to Wittgenstein’s own view, or what I take to be his view, but there is 
still something missing. A quote from a later essay by McDowell probably expresses this 
best: 
Readers of Wittgenstein often suppose that when he mentions customs, 
forms of life, and the like, he is making programmatic gestures towards a 
certain style of positive philosophy: one that purports to make room for talk 
of meaning and understanding, in the face of supposedly genuine obstacles, 
by locating such talk in a context of human interactions conceived as 
describable otherwise than in terms of meaning or understanding. But there 
is no reason to credit Wittgenstein with any sympathy for this style of 
philosophy.39
6 Correction of McDowell 
In this chapter I will argue that McDowell’s problem is that he did not realize why and 
how Wittgenstein’s views are connected to his style of writing in PI. McDowell does say 
that Wittgenstein’s style is important and should not be ignored, but the connection 
between style and method in PI is seldom listed as justification for the particular reading 
of some paragraph of PI. Wittgenstein’s insistence on the connection between style and 
method is noted, but seems to have been lost somewhere on the road to exegesis of 
particular passages. He later realises he is on the wrong track, as the quote above shows, 
but never articulates what exactly he has changed his mind about. The following is an 
attempt at such an articulation. 
I can only speculate on why McDowell did not realize his mistake in the early essay , but 
one suggestion might be that he was more occupied with refuting Wright’s anti-realism 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 277. Minar says something similar: “Elements of this view occur in Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on 
the Foundations of Mathematics (…) and in John McDowell, “Wittgenstein on following a rule”…” Minar, 
”Wittgenstein and the ”contingency” of community”, Footnote 11 on page 218. 
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than reading Wittgenstein carefully. McDowell’s some reading of Wittgenstein suffers 
from a lack of incorporation of passages like §109: 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. (…) 
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanations, 
and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, 
that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems.40
I do not believe McDowell is giving an ‘explanation’ in the sense of ‘explanation’ as ‘a 
constructive account of normativity’, but he seems to be giving something much like a 
description when he asserts that it is in the publicity of language we ‘in fact do find 
normativity’. What I would like both early and later McDowell to explain is exactly why 
Wittgenstein wants to do away with explanations, ‘explanations’ understood as 
‘constructive accounts of normativity in non-normative terms’. Even though McDowell 
does speak out against ‘explanations’, his silence on this point is probably the reason that 
he sometimes, at least seems to be, giving a theory of some sort of where normativity 
comes from. McDowell does reject to answer questions like ‘How is meaning possible?’, 
as opposed to Wright who to tries to answer them. But the rejection of these questions 
takes on a dogmatic character since McDowell only shows us that the questions to lead us 
astray, but not why answering them ends up in confusion. 
McDowell is not the first one to be in this kind of trouble. The difficulty with passages 
such as §109 has not to do with acknowledging that these remarks must be taken 
seriously, rather the problem is making sense of them. Most commentators say they want 
to take §109 seriously and often accuse their opponents of not doing so. Yet they often 
end up with what look like theories.41 So the challenge is not to keep these remarks in 
mind, but to see how they relate to Wittgenstein’s overall argument - to implement them. 
We must answer questions like: “But don’t we unavoidably have theories just by having 
an opinion?” “Will not any description also be an explanation?” 
                                                 
40 A similar passage is §133: “For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” 
41  The most famous example of this is probably Norman Malcolm's 1954 discussion of PI. More examples 
could be given, but space does not allow for it. (Malcolm, Norman. ”Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations”. Philosophical review, vol.63 no. 4, (1954): 530-559.) 
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Edward Minar seems to me to give a good explanation for the reason for why style and 
method are so tightly connected in PI. The arguments of the rest of this chapter rely 
heavily on his papers. 
The rule-following considerations as a reductio argument 
A good place to start the examination of the link between style and content, is the rule-
following paradox of §201. This is a good starting point because both McDowell and 
Wright spend considerable time on it, and both readings are debatable. The rule-following 
paradox is also a good way to show how Edward H. Minar’s reading of PI puts on the 
agenda something that Wright failed to notice, and McDowell does not write about. 
Minar believes that “…rules serve as a “best case” for the kind of picture Wittgenstein 
wants to uproot.”42 So much is uncontroversial, at least at first sight. The bolder claim is 
that Wittgenstein “…fights the picture of meanings as rule-like items not so much by 
showing it wrong as by pointing to its emptiness…”43 Now that might not seem 
controversial either, but when played out it is clearly contrary to what Wright, and to 
some extent the early McDowell, say and supplements McDowell’s later reading of 
Wittgenstein. According to Minar, Wittgenstein is in the rule-following discussion, not so 
much giving a reductio, as forcing “…us to try to articulate what we find missing in our 
practices.”44 This is not a denial of the claim that Wittgenstein is making some kind of 
reductio ad absurdum argument in §201. What is up for discussion is what dialectical role 
the reductio argument has in the overall argument of PI. 
The rule-following discussion in PI is a perfect example of Wittgenstein’s way of giving 
an argument. He is not, as many commentators seem to assume, giving definite and 
exhaustive arguments against a certain philosophical position, say that of Russell or of 
Frege. Reading through PI, it is clear to the careful reader that Wittgenstein does not make 
blatant prohibitions. He does not say ”this is allowed” or ”this is nonsense”. Rather he 
goes along with the first steps of his opponents’ arguments and invites them to articulate 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 204. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 210. 
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more clearly what problem they are trying to solve. Through this Wittgenstein hopes it 
will become clear that his opponents are ‘lost in their own words’. 
Minar believes that “The view that §201 represents a reductio of a particular position (…) 
is at best misleading.”45 He gives two reasons for this. The first is that it “seems to me to 
leave too many paths of resistance available to those seriously tempted by the idea of 
determinate meanings underlying our uses of expressions.”46 One such “path of 
resistance” could for example be that the only thing the paradox proves is that we have a 
lot of work to do, not that finding a foundation for normativity in language will forever be 
impossible. An imaginative opponent could probably come up with several more 
objections.  Interpreting the rule-following discussion as a reductio of some particular 
position cannot be what Wittgenstein intended because, firstly, he does not give a detailed 
argument against each of all the philosophical positions that might disagree with him, and 
secondly, his claims are more radical. He aims for “… complete clarity. But this means 
that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.”47 (§133) Such a radical 
break as Wittgenstein is aiming for is not achieved by arguing against one philosophical 
argument. The problem has to be taken at the root. And the root is not only the 
Augustinian picture of language, or Russell’s picture of language, etc, but the motivation 
behind them. Wittgenstein is in the rule-following considerations indirectly saying 
something about philosophy more than he is arguing against a particular position in the 
history of philosophy. 
This leads us on to Minar’s second reason for being reluctant to saying that §201 presents 
a reductio argument. He says that: 
…to depict §201 as a reductio that serves to show the falsehood of a definite 
and clearly stateable presupposition or conception runs the risk of distorting 
the kind of criticism in which Wittgenstein is engaged here. (…) 
Wittgenstein is certainly tracing the potential effects of certain pictures, 
reminding us of their dangerous (or even absurd) applications; but to see his 
                                                 
45 Minar, “Paradox and Privacy”, 45. (Minar, Edward H. “Paradox and Privacy: On §§201-202 of 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV (1994): 
43-75.) 
46 Ibid., 45. 
47 “It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of words in unheard-of ways. For 
the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical 
problems should completely disappear.” It is Wittgenstein’s own emphasis. 
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treatment of the paradox of §201 as an argument for a particular and definite 
(negative) conclusion may lead us astray.48
The emphasis is on what kind of criticism Wittgenstein is making. Is Wittgenstein's 
argument of the kind where we state definite and exhaustive arguments, as the proponents 
of the standard reductio reading presuppose? After all, the traditional view seems to be, 
that a vague reductio argument would not be a reductio argument. If we attempt to reduce 
some argument to an absurd conclusion, then each step has to be rigorously convincing. 
The thesis of this essay is that Wittgenstein wants us to become unsatisfied with our 
questions more than he wants to prove us wrong, because attempting to ‘prove’ anything 
inevitably leads us astray. 
The difficulty of writing on and arguing for the plausibility of such a position is that it 
would be odd to try to give definite and exhaustive reasons for why definite and 
exhaustive reasons cannot be given. So I will have to show that Minar’s point makes 
sense rather than proving him correct. 
One way of showing rather than proving Wittgenstein’s point is what we might call “the 
paradox of understanding the paradox”. 
The paradox of understanding the paradox 
We need to look at Wittgenstein’s argument on two levels. The first level is the long lines 
that run throughout PI and the second level are the local argument. If we ignore the basic 
‘long lines’ level then we get problems at the local level. McDowell, in the paper we are 
looking at, and especially Wright, get the local point of the paragraphs leading up to §202 
wrong because they overlook the long lines of the PI. We could put the point humorously 
by saying that the ‘paradox of understanding the paradox’ is a reductio argument against 
the classical reading of §201 as a reductio argument.49  
In §185 Wittgenstein asks us to imagine teaching a pupil to write down a series of 
numbers of the form 0, n, 2n, 3n, etc., n being +1. And we ask him to go on till he reaches 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 46. 
49 By a standard or classical reading of §201 as a reductio argument I think of readings of Wittgenstein's as 
those of Wright, Kripke, Meredith Williams, Baker and Hacker, etc. and not those of, for example, Marie 
McGinn, Cavell, Diamond and Conant, etc. The lists could easily be expanded, and some names perhaps 
moved a round, depending on what essays we read, but that will have to be left for a later occasion.  
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1000. Then we are to imagine asking the pupil to continue a series from 1000 and 
upwards with “n” as “+2”. The pupil then writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012, etc. and not 
1000, 1002, 1004 as we expect him to. The following discussion then takes place between 
the teacher and the pupil:  
We say to him: “Look what you’ve done!” –He doesn’t understand. We say: 
“You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!” –He answers: 
“Yes, isn’t it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it.” (§185) 
This situation occurs because the pupil has interpreted the teacher’s instructions in 
another way than they were meant. Hence the pupil’s remark about ‘meant’. The result is 
the rule-following paradox stated by Wittgenstein in §201. 
This was our paradox; no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because any course of action can be made out to accord with a rule. The 
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it 
can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here. 
The discussion of this paragraph has mostly revolved around what could replace 
interpretation as the normative basis of rule governed language use. Minar, as an answer 
to this, points out what we could call the paradox of understanding the paradox. 
The example with the pupil serves its purpose because we understand the absurdity in the 
pupil’s inability to grasp the correct continuation of the series. We do see, without any 
hesitation, what the teacher intended. There is no doubt that it is the pupil that has Ms. 
understood the rule. If there had been any doubt about who was correct, the example 
could not have served its purpose. We know what is right, but not how to justify it. If we 
were in doubt about who was right, we would discuss that and not how we know that the 
teacher is right. 
What makes the situation strange is if we try applying the supposed lesson from the 
example, that any “course of action can be made out to accord with a rule”, to the 
example itself. In Minar’s words: 
But if every way of understanding an interpretation depended on a yet 
deeper interpretation, how could we ever understand what the original 
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interpretation dictates? This in turn leads to the important question: How, 
then, would we understand the problem of interpretation at the outset?50
Spelling out what the premises and conclusion of the usual reading of the rule-following 
considerations are might make Minar’s point clearer. 
(1) Whenever we act on a rule, we first interpret it.  
(2) We want to make a series of numbers using the rule of adding 2 at each 
step.  
(3) One interpretation of this instruction is, ”when arriving at 1000, continue 
it by writing 1002, 1004, 1006, etc”.  
(4) Another interpretation of this instruction is, “when arriving at 1000, 
continue it by writing 1004, 1008, 1012, etc”. 
(5) Any arbitration between these incompatible interpretations of (2), would 
itself be an interpretation and therefore not be of any help as the 
arbitration itself would have at least one competing interpretation.  
(6) Since we know that it is (3) and not (4) that is the right interpretation of 
(2), there must be something wrong with (1). 
(7) Since there is something wrong with (1), we cannot use the concept of 
‘interpretation’ as a foundation for the concept of ‘acting on a rule’. 
The standard reading consequently focuses on what Wittgenstein wants to replace 
‘interpretation’ with. The problem with this reading lies in the antecedent of (6): That the 
teacher’s way of completing the series is right and the pupil’s is wrong. We could specify 
(6) as follows: 
(6 a) The teacher’s interpretation of how the series should be continued has 
authority over the pupil’s interpretation. 
(6 b) We just know that it is the teacher that is right, and not the pupil. 
(6 c) Since (6 a) and (6 b), then there must be something wrong with (1). 
The problem is that proponents of a standard reading, in premise (6 b), allow themselves a 
temporary pause from the demand of ‘interpretation-free justification’ (as specified in 
(5)). They allow themselves a pause from what is the kingpin of the argument as a whole. 
The problem is that (7) not only undermines (1) but also (6 b), and so the argument 
destroys itself. Had we truly believed that what was at stake here was the normativity of 
language, that what was at stake here was preventing linguistic anarchy, then how could 
we accept (6 b) without question when it is precisely the intuitive confidence of (6 b) that 
we are trying to make a foundation for? 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 58. 
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Wittgenstein chose the example of completing a series of numbers because it is a situation 
where doubt about the correct way continuing the series would normally not arise. He 
says that: ”Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally 
reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line 
from finger-tip to rest, not from wrist to finger-tip. ” (§185) Wittgenstein deliberately 
chose as an example a situation where only philosophers, only sceptics, would accept as a 
good question ” How can we know which continuation of the series is right?”. When (7) 
undermines not only (1) but also (6 b) it is precisely because (6 b) rests on the common-
sensical knowledge even we philosophers have, that the pupil’s continuation of the series 
is a very strange one, that the rest of the argument gets off the ground.51
The “paradox of understanding the paradox” faces all those that base their arguments on 
the understanding of the paradox of rule-following, and yet argue that it shows that there 
can never be such a thing as understanding per se, because Wittgenstein has shown us that 
no interpretation can be given priority over another. The “paradox of understanding the 
paradox” shows that those who focus too narrowly on the argument have ended up in 
confusion about what dialectical role it plays in Wittgenstein’s overall argument. Because 
he seems to be sawing off the branch he is sitting on.   
Where a standard reading looks for something to replace ‘interpretation’ with, a full 
appreciation of the argument makes us realise that Wittgenstein’s point here cannot be 
that we should swap ‘interpretation’ with something else. Or, to weaken this perhaps too 
strong assertion, we could say that in a standard reading of the rule-following paradox it 
is too open to interpretation, whether it is the concept of ‘interpretation’ that is the 
problem, or whether it is a particular version of the idea of “language as rule-following’ 
that is the problem.  
Those who focus too much on what might replace ‘interpretation’ miss the most 
important lesson to be learned from the rule-following discussion. Namely, that is, 
                                                 
51  When I introduced the notion of rulefollowing in the beginning of the essay I used as an example 
classification of books into paperbacks and hardbacks and brought out the case of paperback books that 
have been covered with a hard layer of plastic as a case of doubt. Now we can see why Wittgenstein did not 
choose as an example a situation where doubt about how to follow the rules normally arises. 
About this Minar's says: “Here again, the problem is only intelligible if our rule-following practices are, for 
the most part, in order, if, that is, our applications of rules do not, generally speaking, require justification 
by a standard prior to and independent of our actual practices.” Ibid., 59. 
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showing us how philosophers try to question, in some places, what they tacitly take for 
granted in other places. Proponents of a standard reading accept the challenge in 
Wittgenstein’s question “How can we decide which interpretation is the authoritative 
one?” and accept that it dissolves into a reductio argument. The conclusion they draw is 
firstly that ‘interpretation’ cannot serve as a foundation for rule-following, and secondly 
that there therefore is something wrong with the question. And, yes, there is something 
wrong with the question, but not in the way that Wright for example believes. What 
Wittgenstein primarily wants to show us in the rule-following discussion is how we in 
philosophy ask questions that do not arise in the everyday use of language and how these 
questions are artificial. ‘Artificial’ meaning that these questions arise only when we 
impose a different standard of justification on language than we do on philosophy.52
We need to distinguish between the different levels of Wittgenstein’s argument, not only 
to understand the long lines but also to make sense of his local point. So, yes, 
Wittgenstein is giving a reductio argument against theories that depend on using the term 
‘interpretation’. But that is not all that there is to it. Wittgenstein could not just put a 
negation sign in front of the theory he is attacking in the rule-following discussion, and be 
satisfied with having said something true. It is not only the answer he wants to show that 
is wrong, it is the question that demands the wrong kind of answer. We must keep in mind 
the way Wittgenstein argues throughout PI to get it right. What Wittgenstein’s way of 
arguing is, is the question we will now turn to.  
What we should learn from the rule-following considerations 
If Wittgenstein is not primarily giving a reductio argument, what are then the lessons to 
be learned from §§185-201? According to Minar Wittgenstein had two main goals: 
Firstly, he wanted to show that “…locating a basis for what we do in a “deeper” level will 
accomplish nothing.”53 Secondly, “…Wittgenstein challenges the need to find a 
foundation for rule-following; the search in unmotivated.”54  
                                                 
52 See PI §§ 89-133, but especially §§ 97, 89 and 91. 
53 Minar, ”Wittgenstein and the ”contingency” of community”, 215. 
54 Ibid., 215. My emphasis. 
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The first lesson is little more than the uncontroversial point that whatever we posit as a 
basis for meaning, there can be at least two different interpretations of it.55 That if 
“…everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to 
conflict with it” (§201)means that we must give up making a foundation of language that 
uses interpretation as a basic notion. The second lesson might seem innocent enough too 
at first sight. We need to trace the reasoning behind it to see how it is a different solution 
from the classical reading, like that of Wright. Furthermore, it is a correction of 
McDowell’s early reading of Wittgenstein and an attempt at filling out the blanks of the 
sparse comments he makes about what he has changed his mind about in his later 
writings. The following is therefore not merely an exposition of Edward H. Minar’s 
views, but first and foremost, an attempt to explain why Wittgenstein’s method is so 
important, and an elucidation of how this helps us make better sense of the rule-following 
paradox and PI as a whole. 
With the danger of seeming ironic, I will present four theses for how to make better sense 
of Wittgenstein. 
The impossibility of standing outside of language  
A condition for theorizing about how language works is that we can take some kind of 
temporary meta-position. Wittgenstein challenges this very idea of the possibility of 
taking any kind of meta-position on language. The danger of arguing for this particular 
point of Wittgenstein’s view is that the denial of the possibility of having a meta-position, 
could easily look like another meta-point itself. I hope in the following to tread carefully 
enough to not put my second foot in the quicksand while trying to free the first one from 
the mud.56
Minar puts the point of the impossibility of taking a meta-position in the following way: 
                                                 
55 See for example Minar ”Wittgenstein and the ”contingency” of community”, 215: “…locating a basis for 
what we do in a “deeper” level will accomplish nothing. In particular, self-interpreting interpretations which 
operate “by themselves,” beneath our practices, do not serve to show what a rule determines at a particular 
point.” 
56 Or else we could end up with what Wittgenstein warns against in §91: “It may also be put like this: we 
eliminate misunderstanding by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were 
moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our 
investigation.” 
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Wittgenstein has by his own lights no general standpoint from which he can 
demonstrate the illicit nature of the pictures that inform philosophical 
questioning.57
That is the point we stand in risk of missing if we focus too narrowly on §201 as a 
reductio ad absurdum argument. Wittgenstein is asking “Does it make sense?” and is not 
declaring “This is wrong!”. He is doing so because he has realized that he is in no 
position to prove anything. The reason we cannot have an outside perspective is that 
language is not one single phenomenon, but a tangle of different types of human 
interaction and activities. Wittgenstein’s project in PI is that he tries to make us aware of 
the plurality of language and make us realize that we therefore cannot have a perspective 
on language outside of language.  
If Minar is right in saying that Wittgenstein believed that he could not demonstrate that 
his opponents were wrong, then there must, of course, be textual evidence for it. Probably 
the best textual indication that Minar is right is as vague as it is telling. If we read PI 
slowly, in continuity, taking in the all details, it becomes evident that any suggestion that 
Wittgenstein is trying to find a secure foundation for language is contrary to the tone of 
PI. Now, bringing in the tone of a text as an argument is probably a wholly unsatisfactory 
argument for any opponent of either Wittgenstein himself or readings of him like the ones 
Minar, Marie McGinn and Cavell propose. Yet it is imperative for a sensible exposition 
of PI that we do not dismiss the difficult, strange and seemingly misplaced remarks but 
keep in mind that Wittgenstein spent considerable time changing and polishing this text.58 
The elaborate argumentation is there for a reason and should not be dismissed as 
unfinished and brute. 
Unfortunately the tone of PI difficult to show by copying a few quotes from different 
parts of the text. The minute yet important details that give PI its characteristic tones are 
best shown through dialogue. The best that can be done in a written text is to call to 
attention a few passages that exemplify the tone of PI. 
                                                 
57 Minar, “Paradox and Privacy”, 48. 
58 With the possible exception of the lost paragraphs of  PI that section II where meant to replace. See the 
“editor's note” of PI.  
   - 40 -
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know 
your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no 
longer know your way about. (§203) 
This remark, as well as stating the point I am trying to make, is an example supporting it. 
If Wittgenstein’s position had been that he thought he could demonstrate the falsehood of 
the premises backing his adversaries’ conclusions, then why would he think such un-
argumentative remark would be convincing? Why would he “waste” his time with such a 
vague and opaque remark right after he has said what is the heart of the supposed reductio 
argument (in § 201)? Why could he not just spell out the argument in a “nice and orderly” 
way? Is Wittgenstein simply being stubborn about writing philosophy in an unusual style? 
Of course not. It is a direct result of Wittgenstein’s realisation that he cannot give an 
‘objective’ overview of language any more than his opponents can. 
A more indirect textual indication is §200: 
But now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain rules into a 
series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a game – say into 
yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those two people to yell and 
stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in 
such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game 
of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What 
right would one have to say so? 
Note, that while it is clear that Wittgenstein’s answer to the question ”Should we still be 
inclined to say they were playing a game?” is ‘no’, he is not making any prohibition 
against calling this peculiar ‘dance’ a game of chess.59 He asks if we would still call it a 
game. It is obvious that the questions are rhetorical ones and we understand that he wants 
us to answer respectively ‘no’ and ‘none’. What then if we answer ‘yes’ to the first 
question? Would Wittgenstein then say that it is a question we cannot answer in the 
                                                 
59 Baker & Hacker have a very odd, if not wrong, reading of this paragraph. First they say that two people 
sitting by a chessboard moving the pieces, but not moving the according to any rules, would seem to be 
playing something even though they where not. Then they say: “Conversely something that did not look 
remotely like a game, let alone a game of chess, might, in certain circumstances, be one. Imagine a mapping 
of chess moves on to yells and stampings of feet. One can imagine two people yelling and stamping in such 
a way  that if their behaviour is translated into chess moves a coherent game result. Are they playing chess? 
Again, knowing nothing of  their form of life, we would not say so.” From this it seems the Baker and 
Hacker are assuming that it really is a game of chess they are playing, only we cannot know because it is so 
strange. But Wittgenstein’s question indicates the opposite: “What right would one have to say so?” Baker 
& Hacker page 122. (Baker, G. P. and P. M. S. Hacker. Wittgenstein: Rules, grammar and necessity, An 
analytical commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, vol 2. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 
1985.) 
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affirmative? What if we now decide that we from now on do want to call this playing a 
game? It seems we could decide to do so. We would, at least for a long time, think of it as 
funny, i.e. not normal, but it is not impossible to imagine it happening. What 
Wittgenstein’s last question ”What right would one have to say so?” shows is that 
Wittgenstein here is arguing on two levels at the same time. The first level is that, yes, we 
could call it playing a game from now on and where there would be nothing problematic 
about it. The second level is that Wittgenstein, with the question “What right would one 
have to say so?”, is challenging the assumption that we can abstract the rules from the 
context and still keep what is ‘essential’ to chess.  
What eludes those that are not sufficiently attentive to Wittgenstein’s style is that 
Wittgenstein also argues on level one and not only level two. Wittgenstein asks questions 
not only as a rhetorical manoeuvre to ridicule his opponents. He asks us because he has to 
ask us. He does not have an outside point of view of language from where he can point to 
any use of language and say ‘this is correct use of a word’ and ‘this is wrong use of a 
word’. Had he had such an opportunity, there would be a lot less questions in PI. The 
important thing to see is that he is indirectly challenging us, he is asking us if we think it 
makes sense to call this ‘dance’ ‘chess’. He is forcing us to think about how much we can 
extract from a practice and still say it is the same. But he has to ask because this is a 
practice we also share, and therefore can decide to change. Wittgenstein’s point would be 
just as valid if we, who are talking together here, decided to start using the language game 
surrounding chess in a slightly new way. But he has to ask us our opinion because he does 
not have access to any ‘objective answer’ about the use of language, because there is no 
such thing. 
Another example of the tone of PI is §197: 
”It’s as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash.” –And that is 
just what we say we do. That is to say: we sometimes describe what we do 
in these words. But there is nothing astonishing, nothing queer, about what 
happens. 
Here Wittgenstein has to modify his first reaction to the interlocutor by saying that “we 
sometimes describe what we do in these words”. He has to make the qualification because 
he is aware of the fact that he does not possess an objective knowledge of the English 
language. Because there is no such outside position available. Why this is so, is what the 
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next section is about. 
The diversity of language 
To make “The diversity of language” more than an empty slogan Wittgenstein tries to, 
firstly, show that the idea that language is ‘one thing’ is not as intuitive an idea as many 
think and secondly, he parades concrete examples of the diversity of everyday language 
use. PI is riddled with examples where Wittgenstein is challenging us to take in the 
complexity of language and the uniqueness of words. Paragraphs 11 and 12 are some of 
the passages where Wittgenstein tries to demonstrate the plurality of language by using a 
metaphor. They are also, in my opinion, some of the most beautiful rhetorical passages of 
PI. I therefore quote at length. 
§11 Think of the tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a 
rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. –The functions of words are as 
diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are 
similarities.) 
 
Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we 
hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is 
not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy! 
 
§12 It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all 
looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be 
handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously 
(it regulates the opening of a valve); another is the handle of a switch, which 
has only two effective positions, it is either off or on; a third is the handle of 
a break-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the 
handle of a pump: it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro. 
All these different things we do that involve making sounds, etching marks on paper, 
gesticulating, and so on, that we have thrown into a big box marked “language”, all have 
different origins and purposes. Wittgenstein wants to cast doubt on the idea that they can 
all be analysed as one system of concepts. To use Wittgenstein’s metaphor: How can it 
possibly be useful to try to explain the function of a hammer by explaining how glue 
works? But such arguments might not convince Wittgenstein’s adversaries. 
§65 “Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these 
considerations. –For someone might object against me: “You take the easy 
way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said 
what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is 
common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts 
of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that 
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once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of 
propositions and of language.” 
 
And this is true. –Instead of producing something common to all that we call 
language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common 
which makes us use the same words for all, -but that they are related to one 
another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or 
these relationships, that we call them all “language”. 
Thus Wittgenstein renounces the crucial assumption of the philosophy of language of his 
adversaries. Wittgenstein denies that all the instances of ‘making meaningful noises’ can, 
and should, be analysed as one phenomenon. Furthermore, in the absence of a unified 
phenomenon to be analysed, the notion of ‘explanation’ becomes superfluous. Since the 
concept of ‘explanation’ presupposes some generality in the phenomenon to be explained, 
Wittgenstein proposes to “do away with all explanations” and let “description alone” take 
its place (§109). 
The craving for generalised answers 
Wittgenstein believes philosophy starts off wrongly because we want to find what is 
common to all words and we ask questions like “What is meaning?”. Furthermore, 
Wittgenstein says, philosophers assume that “the answer to these questions is to be given 
once and for all; and independently of any future experience.” (§92) Philosophers further 
assume that since this is a good question, and I am not objecting that it is not a good 
question, there must be an answer to it. And an answer to such a question must of course 
abstract away from the contingencies of language so we get a generalised and definite 
answer. Or else we feel we have not answered the question properly. 
To this Wittgenstein says, in §91: 
But now it may look as if there were something like a final analysis of our 
form of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every 
expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, 
unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be 
brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and 
our problem solved. 
 
It may also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstanding by making our 
expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards 
a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real 
goal of our investigation. 
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So we end up craving an answer, a type of answer, to the question “What is meaning?” 
that unfailingly will violate the plurality of language.60
A possible objection might go like this: If what Wittgenstein is saying is that we cannot 
have a meta-language because we are, so to speak, caught in the diversity, then he is on 
collision course with a strong intuition. Even though parts of languages have very specific 
functions there still is a core we can analyse. The core of a language being all those words 
that are mostly detached from particular customs and that can be used in many different 
types of sentences. From an analysis of the core we could then give specific explanations 
of the anomalies at the ‘outer rims’ of language.61 An objection such as this has not 
realised how deep the diversity of language runs. The diversity Wittgenstein is talking is 
more than Austin’s ‘speech acts’, or the differences between sosiolects. 
Firstly, such a ‘communicative core’ can only be characterized as such by being a core, 
not by specifying a set of words and expressions that it would consists of. There are not 
words that are typically ‘members’ of the core and words that belong to the outer rim of 
language. The communicative core consists of the same list of words that we find at the 
outer rims of language, and so an analysis of the core words would also be an analysis of 
the outer rim words. Consequently, an attempt to analyse only ‘core words’ would have to 
handle the diversity of language to the same extent that an attempt to analyse the outer 
rim words would. 
Secondly, the idea that there is a core where words are less dependent on the context is 
dubious. The diversity Wittgenstein is talking about is not only, for example, that 
                                                 
60 Stanley Cavell says on page 188: “I think that what Wittgenstein ultimately wishes to show is that is 
makes no sense at all to give a general explanation for the generality of language.” (Cavell, Stanley. The 
Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, skepticism, morality, and tragedy. New York and Oxford: University Press, 
1979.) 
61 I believed this is something like the objection Cappelen and Lepore make against so-called radical 
contextualist in their book ”Insensitive semantics” chapter 8, although they most certainly would use other 
more guarded words. I have found their book most thought-provoking and hope to some day adapt their 
objection to a Wittgensteinian context. Not all of their arguments will fit as well against Wittgenstein as 
against the radical contextualists, but the core question might be left: “However much of the meaning of a 
word or sentence we can show depends on the context, not everything can depend on the context because 
we could not use just any word whatsoever to convey the same meaning.” I believe the arguments below 
would stand up against Cappelen and Lepore’s objection, although two meager paragraphs are not nearly 
enough to discuss the problem properly. 
Cappelen, Herman and Ernie Lepore. Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech 
act pluralism. Maldon, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell, 2005. 
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indexicals depend on the context for their meaning. Wittgenstein is saying more than just 
that the context ‘fills out’ the meaning of a word. Explaining the differences in detail 
would require an essay on its own, but one example could be the word ‘think’. It is not a 
word that depends very much on the context seen from the point of view of Austin or 
formal semantics. Yet Wittgenstein has no problem spending considerable time on the 
showing its complexity. (See §§316-340.) In §316 Wittgenstein says that: 
In order to get clear about the meaning of the word “think” we watch 
ourselves while we think; (…). –But this concept is not used like that. 
The idea that there is one explanation for a word is not an idea that language itself gives 
us, so to speak, but it is an ideal we think must be there. “How else could it be?” We 
impose our ideal on language.  
Description must take the place of explanation because we in ‘explaining’ demand a 
generality of language that we think ‘must’ be there, but which on close examination is 
foreign to natural languages. 
Quietism and learning to live with groundlessness 
Wittgenstein's appeal to only give descriptions and not ‘explanations’ is often met with 
objections like: “Is Wittgenstein saying that we just should stop asking questions? Is he 
denying that there are good questions? It certainly seems like there are!“ We can now 
meet such objections as the discussion above has shown us that it is our incapacity to 
stand outside of language that prompts Wittgenstein into saying that these questions are 
misguided. The traditional readings of Wittgenstein has taken him as saying that we ought 
to “leave the questions alone”, because they will only confuse us. A slightly caricatured 
way of putting the point would be to say that Wittgenstein has been believed to think that 
we out to exercise some sort of philosophical self-control and stop asking questions that 
will leads us nowhere. This is not far from what Wittgenstein does say, but the full picture 
must include the rationale behind it: Not only is the diversity of language overlooked in 
questions concerning the generality of language , but we ourselves do not have any meta-
perspective on this diversity from which we can give an answer of the kind the question 
craves. Not only is there no answers to such questions, the questions themselves are 
confused. 
Wittgenstein’s ‘quetism’ is thus a result, more of the impossibility of answering these 
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questions, than that the questions themselves are bad. A question that cannot be answered 
might be a good question in the sense that it is an interesting question, and still be bad in 
the sense that there must be something wrong about it if there cannot possibly be an 
answer to it.62 Wittgenstein’s ‘quetism’ is a result of his realisation that we inevitably 
distort language if we think we should find a generalised answer. Just because a language 
lends itself to asking misguided questions, does not mean that language allows for 
meaningful answers to them. The ‘quietism’ concerns giving the type of answers that 
philosophers have traditionally demanded. 
The reason we are you using the word “quietism” in quotation marks is that the idea that 
there is a quietism in PI, rests on the lack of understanding the importance of connection 
between style and content in PI. Wittgenstein is not just ‘refusing to speak’. The elaborate 
though strange style of PI shows that he is doing just the opposite. But doing so in the 
only way left open for him. Understanding the rationale behind the style of PI, opens up 
for the realisation that what is interpreted as “quietism” is and imperative part of 
conveying the ideas of PI. 
Wright does not seem to have any suggestion – at least any explicit suggestion – as to 
what Wittgenstein’s reason for his ‘quetism’ is. The early McDowell on the other hand, 
has a clearer, though only implicit, assumption. He seems to be assuming something like 
that we simply have to learn to live with groundlessness: there is no foundation for 
language, because language does have normativity even without any theory of what it is. 
The customs and practices that constitute language are foundation enough.63 McDowell, 
in the later essays, is much clearer on that the so-called quietism is not a dogmatic 
restriction Wittgenstein puts on himself, but a misinterpreted result of Wittgenstein's 
attempt at us by other means than a ‘argument’ in the traditional sense.  More on this 
below. 
We could say , with Minar, that what all these considerations add up to is that:  
                                                 
62 §79: ”Should it be said that I am using a word whose meaning I don’t know, and so am talking nonsense? 
-Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you see them 
there is a good deal that you will not say.)  
63 Probably the closest McDowell comes to openly express such an assumption is the last sentence of the 
second last paragraph on page 242 of: “Wittgenstein on following a rule”. 
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 Properly understood, Wittgenstein awakens us to the realization that we 
have no standpoint from which to raise a general demand for independent 
normative standards for our practices. More specifically, he elicits the 
recognition that the effort to express such demands comes to grief; in effect, 
we do not know what we mean to be asking for when we require or seek 
‘foundations of language’.64   
The perspective on the McDowell/Wright debate 
Wright  
According to Minar, community views like the one Wright has, are mistaken because they 
want something “that points behind our practices, or goes beyond the explanations we 
offer in our everyday dealings.”65 The community view starts from the assumption that, 
since Wittgenstein says that private rule-following is impossible, he must be saying that 
language is something we have in a community. Because that is the only alternative the 
proponents of the community view see. 
One of McDowell arguments against the community view is that there cannot be 
normativity in a ‘community language’ more than in private language, because the ‘is 
right/seems right’ problem is just as much of a problem for the community view as for the 
private language.66  My guess is that the proponents of a community view are not 
convinced by such an argument because they cannot see why Wittgenstein should refuse 
to have a theory of how normativity is possible. There are two main problems for the 
community view. The first is that it overlooks the diversity of language by expecting that 
one analysis can be given for all of it. They do not realise that it is the diversity of 
language Wittgenstein is trying to show when he asks questions like “Is that how we use 
it? Look at how we ordinarily use it!”67. The second problem is that they do not realise 
this because they have not understood that Wittgenstein himself has no standpoint from 
where to prove the diversity of language, so he has to show it. Proponents of the 
community view, at least Wright, seek a constructive account to questions like ”How is 
                                                 
64 Minar, “Paradox and Privacy”, 43. 
65 Minar, ”Wittgenstein and the ”contingency” of community”, 206. 
66 “Whatever is going to seem right to us is right.” See the section with the summary of McDowell’s view. 
67 See for example passages like §§66, 78, 313, 327, 340; and countless other like them. 
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meaning possible?”, not understanding that Wittgenstein ‘is not in the business of giving 
constructive accounts’.  
McDowell  
According to McDowell, his disagreement with Wright revolves around the question of 
where publicity enters the picture.68 On other occasions he mentions Wright’s failure to 
appreciate the importance of having a concept of understanding that does not involve 
interpretation. (Which is what Wittgenstein asks for in §201.) Where Wright only has 
external facts to deal with, and therefore inevitably ends up with interpretation at some 
point, McDowell has the ‘meeting of minds’. 69 Accordingly, publicity enters Wright’s 
picture as the place where mutual correction, and therefore genuine rule-following, 
occurs. For the early McDowell publicity enters the picture as the place where it is that 
we in fact do have normativity in language. Publicity is not there to ‘secure’ that we avoid 
the is right/seems right problem the way it does for Wright. What ‘secures’ normativity 
are the practices they are founded in. Language is therefore public in the sense that 
practices are something we have in a group of people. For McDowell the key to avoid 
saying we always interpret rules is by belonging to a custom, practice, or institution.70 
The argument seems to be that, if we realize, the fundamental character of (linguistic) 
practices, we will be able to see that we do not interpret rules for words but act on them 
directly. 
A brief comment on what “custom, practice, or institution” mean is needed before we 
complete McDowell’s argumentation. For Wittgenstein these words mean something 
slightly different than they ordinarily do and misunderstandings here might lead to a 
rejection of Wittgenstein’s overall point. For Wittgenstein custom means something more 
than custom in the sense of buying gifts for Christmas, that a bride often has a white dress 
at the wedding, etc. When he uses custom he does not mean it in the way that we might 
agree or disagree with a given custom. For example I might not like using a suit at big 
                                                 
68 McDowell, “Wittgenstein on following a rule”, 260. 
69 Ibid., 253.  
70 “How can a performance both be nothing but a ”blind” reaction to a situation, not an attempt to act on an 
interpretation (avoiding Scylla); and be a case of going by a rule (avoiding Charybdis)? The answer is: by 
belonging to a custom (PI §198), practice (PI §202) or institution (RFM VI-31).” Ibid., 242. “RFM” is 
McDowell’s abbreviation for Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics by Wittgenstein. 
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family gatherings, and apart from my mother’s irritation, there is no problem with that. 
For Wittgenstein custom is the common ground we all share. They are those things we 
have as a starting point from where we might disagree. Similarly, institution is not 
primarily such things as the judicial system, the university, etc. Such institutions can be 
changed, closed down and forgotten. Institutions such as the family, the pupil teacher 
relationship, etc, are closer to what Wittgenstein has in mind, but these too need some sort 
of social ratification. What Wittgenstein needs in the notion of institution is the 
‘unconscious starting point’ side of it. What we all take for granted in such a degree that 
we do not even think about it. 
The last concept is ‘practice’. This is the best word to use as Wittgenstein’s use of it is not 
as far from everyday use as ‘custom’ and ‘institution’ are. A practice is something we do 
regularly. It does not have some much of a ‘contingent’ feeling about it as ‘custom’ and 
‘institution’. We do not, for example, vote over a practice. It is something we just do. 
Often almost without thinking about it because it is so natural for us to do so. If a stranger 
on the street asks us for the time, we answer her. If someone calls our name we turn to see 
who is calling. A practice is for Wittgenstein all those things we do that are so much part 
of just being a person, in a specific culture at a specific time, that we seldom think 
consciously about it but simply act on them. Much more could of course be said about 
this, but it has to be left for another occasion although I will touch indirectly on the same 
issue in chapter three under the heading “How we learn new words”. 
Having in mind the foundational character of practices it is easier to understand how 
McDowell can say that we do not interpret practices, we act on them directly.71 The 
foundational character of practices is also what prompts the early McDowell to say that 
there is a “meeting of minds”.72 This is possible, the implicit assumption seems to be, 
because normativity is found in that words are a result of practices. And had they not 
been, there would not be normativity. The crucial difference from Wright is that he wants 
                                                 
71 See for example §§ 216, 219 and 240: “Disputes the do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over 
the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for example. That is 
part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).” 
72 “In the different picture I have described, the response to Wittgenstein’s problem works because a 
linguistic community is conceived as bound together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to 
just anyone), but by a capacity for a meeting of minds.” Ibid., 253.  
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to explain normativity in terms of practices, he wants to give a reductive analysis of 
normativity in language in terms of mass-rule-following. 
There is much that correct in the idea from McDowell's early essay; that normativity is 
found in that words are a result of practices. It is indeed much closer to what Wittgenstein 
intended than the community views. However, it does too easily invite objections. The 
main problem is that it does not carry much persuasive force because it is unable to give 
the rationale for the ‘quietism’. Consequently there does not seem to be any intolerable 
cost attached to simply rejecting the imperative “to stop asking questions”. The stubborn 
opponent might simply say that he would prefer to face difficult questions rather than just 
stop asking them.  
Minar’s view has an advantage in that, in contrast to the early McDowell and as a 
supplement to the later McDowell, he illuminates Wittgenstein's rationale for his 
supposed quietism and makes evident the cost attached to asking questions demanding 
generalised answers. The cost is that they inevitably lead us astray. They lead us astray 
because questions demanding generalised answers by definition overlook the diversity of 
language. We have no meta-point from where to even ask such questions, let alone 
answer them. Talking of normativity as ‘meeting of minds’, at as the early McDowell 
does, looks suspiciously much like something that can only be said from a meta 
perspective. In Minar’s words: 
Wittgenstein, on my reading, makes us realize that we do not even 
understand the point of view from which we thought the challenge could be 
advanced. There is no failure, because there is no coherent task.73
What role does publicity have in rule-following? 
The question from the heading of chapter two has not yet been answered: what role does 
publicity have in rule-following? Or maybe we should ask whether the question demands 
the wrong type of answer? Is the question ”What role does publicity have in rule-
following?” a question Wittgenstein would have asked? In light of the discussion up to 
now it seems that we have to of answer this in the negative.  
                                                 
73 Minar. Footnote 15 on page 223 of: ”Wittgenstein and the ”contingency” of community”.  
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We could answer the question of the title by saying that ”Language is public in the sense 
that its origins lies in our common human nature” if we, for a moment, leave aside the 
philosophical connotations such a sentence would evoke. If this assertion had been made 
by a literate though philosophically uneducated friend, Wittgenstein might have agreed. 
But the instant the same friend tried to specify what ‘public’ meant, he would be at odds 
with what Wittgenstein writes in PI. Wittgenstein could say that language in some sense 
is something public, but such formulations must never be taken as an analysis of how 
normativity is achieved in natural languages. We would then be doing the same mistake 
as the early McDowell, by making it look as if Wittgenstein is answering the question 
”How is normativity possible?”.  
The philosophical force of PI lays not in the conclusions that are reached, if we even want 
to say that there are any conclusions, but in how they are reached. Wittgenstein is 
impeded from arguing in a “normal manner” and is “forced” to use a therapeutic 
argumentative style because of the nature of his conclusion. Consequently, quite a few 
passages of the PI have a “best before” rhetorical limit to them. Some of the arguments of 
PI serve temporary goals. An example of such a temporary goal is the argument against 
the possibility of a private language. It serves the purpose of undermining the “ostensive 
definitions” model of language. The same is true of the rule-following discussion. That 
means that trying to answer the question “What role does publicity have in rule-
following?” inevitably will lead us astray. We should only answer the question as a part 
of a process of showing the plurality and “un-generalisability” of language. Therefore, 
stating as an answer to the question of the heading that “Language is public in the sense 
that its origins lies in our common human nature” must not be considered as the closing 
words of the discussion.74
                                                 
74 There is however a philosophically innocent way of talking about language as rule-following that should 
be mentioned. I take it that Wittgenstein would be fine with saying things like “In Spanish, the rule is to 
always put the emphasis on the second last word in a sentence”. Language is rule-following in such a 
commonsense understanding of ‘following a rule’. Playing with language rules is perhaps the most 
important tool when, for example, writing poetry. The conception of language as rule-following becomes 
problematic in the context of an ‘ostensive definitions’ model of language. 
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The new conception of publicity applied 
7 The potential of the new conception of publicity 
A common complaint against Wittgenstein, a frustration that is expressed more often in 
seminars and discussion than in writing, is that Wittgenstein takes the fun out of 
philosophy. It is complained that Wittgenstein dictum against theses, generalisation and 
explanation takes away three of the most important tools in philosophy. And if that was 
not enough, he does not even put forward a proper argument for his views, but leaves us 
with nothing but vague remarks about “dissolving questions” and “philosophy as therapy” 
(§133). Consequently, some philosophers seem to think, Wittgenstein must be wanting to 
put an end to philosophy, or at least putting an end to philosophy as an academic 
discipline where thorough argumentation is the ideal.75 This is sometimes even equated 
with giving up understanding and inquisitiveness as such. Even though such imputations 
are a result of frustration over Wittgenstein’s style of writing more than anything else, and 
those that make the complaints realise that there must be something they are missing, they 
express a prevailing sentiment against Wittgenstein. 
Accusations as these are unequivocal symptoms of that we are dealing with readings of PI 
that are unable to explain the rationale behind the connexion between Wittgenstein’s 
style and his ideas. This rationale is exactly what is illuminated in the readings of 
Wittgenstein proposed by Minar, McGinn and McDowell in his later essays. As we have 
already seen, understanding this rationale is the piece of the puzzle that completes the 
picture enough so as to enable us to understand where Wittgenstein is headed at when he 
argues against seeing rule-following as a constitutive of normativity in language. 
Furthermore, understanding the connection between Wittgenstein’s style of the writing 
and his views allows us to form a much more positive view on what philosophy after 
Wittgenstein can be. 
Wittgenstein’s views on philosophy do not mean the “end of philosophy”. It is the 
complete opposite; a whole new field of investigation opens up! Now that the illusion that 
                                                 
75 Minar makes the same observation in ”Feeling at home in language”, 416. 
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only generality can cast light on a subject is gone, the world lies open for descriptive 
investigations of all the phenomena that make up human life. Giving up making theses 
does not mean giving up inquisitiveness and systematic thinking. It only means that we 
have to be careful about being captured by words and that ‘progress’ in philosophy is not 
of the ‘scientific kind’ that for example Russell wanted. A new Wittgensteinian outlook 
on philosophy will give answers, not of the kind employing generality, but give answers 
in the sense that our inquisitive nature will be satisfied. What follows is an attempt at an 
exemplification of how Wittgenstein's perspective on language can satisfy our 
inquisitiveness concerning words for emotions.  
8 Applying the new conception of publicity 
In the introduction I gave some example of questions a non-philosopher might ask about 
how words for emotions work. It is already clear that Wittgenstein would say that these 
simple questions already have taken us a few steps down the path to confusion. My hope 
is to in the following, give an example of how the lessons from McDowell, Minar and 
Marie McGinn can be applied to the subject of emotions. The following is therefore less 
an investigation of what Wittgenstein has to say about these subjects, than an attempt at 
an exemplification of the fruitfulness of a reading of Wittgenstein of the sort that 
McDowell, Minar and McGinn propose. Not only is their approach more exegetically 
accurate, but most of all, it opens up for a new way of doing philosophy. What comes 
below should therefore be read from two perspectives. Firstly, it exemplifies how I 
believe we can do philosophy in a way that is sensitive to Wittgenstein's insights. 
Secondly, it shows that a Wittgensteinian approach to the subject of words for emotions is 
enlightening. It leaves our inquisitiveness satisfied. This second point needs a clarification 
before we go on to the task itself. 
We have already discussed the reason Wittgenstein only wants to give ‘descriptions’ and 
not ‘explanations’. one of the questions Wittgenstein's argumentation on this topic leaves 
us with, is the question of what the goal of philosophy of language is. What should a 
successful philosophical argument achieve? Exactly what it is a good theory of language 
will put us in a better position to understand? the answer to this question has been unclear 
right from when analytic philosophy of language started by Russell’s criticism of Frege. 
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Are we constructing a semantics for a language that is supposed to fill some specific role? 
Are we describing how natural languages work? Or is the role of philosophy of language 
to see how much of natural language we can reductively describe by using the tools 
invented for constructing a semantics of a artificial language? A clarification of what the 
task of philosophy of language is, is long overdue. Hopefully this is a subject I will be 
able to work with on a later occasion.  
To avoid disappearing in to a discussion about the role of philosophy of language I have 
chosen to show the potential of a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophical questions by 
looking at how he could handle the philosophically laden yet naïve questions of a 
philosophical layman. I have chosen to in the following work with two such questions. I 
believe questions of this kind are questions both Wittgenstein and his adversaries will 
think of as questions deserving philosophical examination. I thus hope to be able to 
exemplify the potential of a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophical questions while 
avoiding to have to say anything about what the ‘ultimate goal of philosophy’ is. 
Questions as these are also of particular interest from a Wittgensteinian point of view 
since Wittgenstein believed that philosophical confusion starts with asking just those 
naïve yet confused questions. 
To make the discussion easier I have chosen to formulate both of the naïve yet 
philosophically laden questions on the background of a passage from the book “The city 
of the red cloak” by the Turkish writer Asli Erdogan. The story of the book takes place in 
Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. The main character is walking on a usually busy street that is 
empty because everybody is watching the football match between Brazil and Russia. 
Then, in the pouring rain, she sees a homeless person lying across a small pond on the 
sidewalk outside the movie theatre Cinelandia. To say that life has not been kind to him 
would be a cruel understatement. He is starved and is struggling to reach over to his 
vomit, looking for pieces he can eat. The narrating main character then writes: 
I have to tell about a man I encountered over by Cinelandia half an hour 
before the Russia – Brazil match, at a specific point in time and place; I have 
to tell it to everybody, whether they want to listen or not. I have to pay for 
the scream that stuck in my throat. (…) 
 
However, now that I look at the letters I have lined up, on the white 
emptiness in front of me, I cannot see that man. I am still in lack of a 
language in which to tell about him. I am not strong enough, cruel and 
merciful enough. I haven’t starved enough. Words cannot give him his life 
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back, but they can at least re-establish his name: He was a Human.76  
This passage could be interpreted and analysed in several ways, but I will concentrate on 
one. The first aspect I want to emphasise is that the author says that she “lacks a 
language” in which to express her experience. She is unable to find words that cover what 
she wants to communicate. The idea I want to pursue is that we sometimes blame the lack 
of appropriate words for our inability to psychologically cope with a situation. I find the 
passage above as a good example of that, although other interpretations of course are 
possible.77
The first naïve yet philosophically inclined question I want to ask is: “Why can’t we just 
make up a word to cover the emotion we want to express? Couldn't our desperate need to 
express ourselves be satisfied if  we just ostensively baptize the emotion we have no word 
for, and thus have a word to express it with?” The second aspect the philosophical 
layman might want to emphasise is that, even if the author had been able to express her 
impression perfectly, we readers would still not have the same emotion after having read 
it as the author had when she wrote it. The philosophically inclined layman might put the 
point bluntly by saying that: “We cannot link into each others minds and communicate 
our experiences directly”. This truth could, and has been, expressed as “only I know what 
I feel”. The layman might agree and add: “But how is it then, that we are able to 
communicate emotions at all?” 
Wittgenstein, beyond doubt, believes that these simple questions already have taken us a 
few steps down the path of confusion. We should therefore not attempt to answer the 
questions as they stand. We will in the following look at how understanding Wittgenstein 
                                                 
76 Erdogan, Asli. Byen med den røde kappa. Translated from Turkish by Gunvald Ims. Oslo: Gyldendal, 
2004. Pages 139-140. 
The book has not been translated to English and I have therefore translated the text from Norwegian to 
English. I am grateful to the Norwegian translator of the book, Gunvald Ims, for making important 
adjustments to the translation. The Norwegian translation reads: “Jeg er nødt til å fortelle om denne mannen 
som jeg kom over ved Cinelandia en halvtime før Russland-Brasil kampen, altså på et bestemt tidspunkt i 
tid og rom; jeg må fortelle det til alle, om de vil høre på eller ikke. Jeg må betale noe som veier opp for det 
skriket som satte seg fast i halsen. (…) Men nå, når jeg ser på bokstavene jeg har stilt opp på det tomme, 
hvite papiret, får jeg ikke øye på han. Jeg mangler fortsatt språket til å fortelle om han. Jeg er ikke sterk, 
grusom og barmhjertig nok. Jeg har ikke sulta nok. Ord kan ikke gi han livet tilbake, men kan i det minste 
gi han et navn: Han var et Menneske.”.  
77 I understand the sentences ”I am not strong enough, cruel and merciful enough. I haven’t starved 
enough.” as indicating, not that having some particular experience would put her in a position where she 
could communicate, but as indicating the psychological shock of a middle-class woman encountering such a 
brutal example of poverty. 
   - 56 -
can change the motivation behind questions such as these. We will respect the 
philosophical layman’s craving for a satisfaction of his in inquisitiveness, while still not 
answering the questions with the kind of answer he would expect. A kind answer for 
example of Wright would give him.  
I will in the following focus only on two topics Wittgenstein discusses that are relevant 
for the two questions above: the first is how we learn new words and the second is how 
the first person/third person asymmetry of words for emotions is rooted in their grammar. 
(‘Grammar’ in Wittgenstein’s sense.) That is not to say that what follows is an exhaustive 
commentary on everything Wittgenstein has to say about the subject of words for 
emotions. Topics that are obviously relevant like the inner/outer distinction, the private 
language argument, colour words, etc., are left out or only treated indirectly. This is an 
exemplification of how a Wittgensteinian outlook on philosophy is both productive and 
useful; an exemplification taking words for emotions as a subject.  
How we learn new words 
Discussing how we learn new words will cast light on the topic of words for emotions for 
two reasons. Firstly, it provides an example of how Wittgenstein’s style is connected to 
his overall point in PI. That, according to Wittgenstein, language is a bundle of 
phenomena and giving one analysis of all language is not possible. What is similar for all 
those phenomena we call language is, firstly, that it has been invented by us humans and, 
secondly, that it is closely interwoven with our customs and practices. 
The second reason that how we learn words is interesting for understanding words for 
emotions is that learning a new word seems to be the thing we want to when we try to 
express an unfamiliar emotion. 
This section relies heavily on chapter seven, “Excursus on Wittgenstein’s vision of 
language”, of Stanley Cavell’s book “The claim of reason”. 
Pointing and naming 
The backdrop of Cavell’s discussion is the Augustinian picture of language that 
Wittgenstein describes in the first paragraphs of PI. For Augustine, learning ones mother 
tongue is not all that different from learning a foreign language. You see something you 
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want to say something about, point it out and ask for its name.78 If we, with this picture as 
our background, try to answer the first naïve yet philosophical question above, we 
immediately run into trouble. 
First of all we need to ask if it is possible to just name an emotion something. Could we 
see it happening in real life? The common sense answer to this is yes. I believe 
Wittgenstein would answer yes too. What Wittgenstein attacks in the Private Language 
Argument is not the idea that we could name some hitherto un-named emotion, but the 
idea that what really happens is that we connect the stream of sounds with an mental state 
by way of making a rule about it. For the philosophical layman, it is the inclination 
towards thinking about language as this kind of rule-following that is the first step 
towards confusion. 
The second step is the idea that it is a lack of appropriate words that prompts the author 
to write: “I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him”. If all we do when we 
learn a word is point to something and connect what we point to with a stream of sounds, 
then would the author feel she has expressed her experience in a satisfactory way? Above 
I said that Wittgenstein could save that we can invent names for our emotions, but now I 
have to qualify that. It is possible to come up with names for till now un-experienced 
emotions, but is it coming up with and name that (usually) gives us emotional peace? So 
yes, we can find a name for an emotion, but blaming a “lack of language in which to 
express something” will usually be a linguistic camouflage for some other psychological 
need. 
From what the author says about “not having starved enough”, etc., it seems quite obvious 
that she would not be satisfied with simply making some stream of sounds a symbol for a 
past experience. What is interesting here is not primarily whether inventing a new word 
would communicate what the author wants to say to her readers, but if she herself would 
feel satisfied with the new word. Would she, which writes: “However, now that I look at 
the letters I have lined up, on the white emptiness in front of me, I cannot see that man. I 
am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him.”, feel that, as she now has 
                                                 
78 When I write about “Augustine’s view of language” I keep to Wittgenstein’s exposition of him. I am 
aware that an apology for Augustine is possible to make, but the views of the philosopher Augustine’s are 
not what is at stake here. 
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ostensively baptized the emotion, she finally has a “language in which to tell about him”? 
Would she feel she has expressed her desperation if she just decides to name the hitherto 
inexpressible emotion, for example with the following random juxtaposition of letters, 
‘compa’? Of course not. So Wittgenstein could say that we can name any emotion 
whatever we want, but that such a baptism might not give us the benefits we thought it 
would give. One of the result of the process the author has to go through to be able to deal 
with her experience might be that she finds a word that describes the situation, but that 
word would not do the same “psychological work” for someone who has not gone 
through that process. 
The first vaccination against the pointing and naming idea of language is that we need to  
“…reconsider the obvious fact that there is not the clear difference between learning and 
maturation that we sometimes suppose there is.”79 For example, there are certain things 
that need to be in place before we can start learning words.80  These things we are taught. 
When we as infants learn the word ‘food’ we thereby do not know what all types of things 
are foods. And that some food is liquid, but not everything that is liquid that we put in the 
mouth is food, that some food must be cut, etc. The word ‘food’ is part of a whole system 
of practices and words. When we learn a second language we do not need to learn more 
than what the equivalent for ‘food’ is in that other language to be able to use it. But when 
we learn it for the first time we have to learn not only what food means but also what food 
is. Augustine assumes too much when he believes that all we need is the labels for the 
categories ‘we already have’. 
Augustine makes this mistake because he, probably amongst other things, assumes that 
language is one thing. Had it been, it would have made sense to look for one or a few 
mechanisms by which we make new words. For example by ostensive definitions. Having 
realised that language is not one unified phenomena, but a bundle of phenomena, a search 
for the mechanism for making new words is no longer natural. We learn language in just 
as many different ways as there are different parts of language, so we should learn to 
appreciate and study the diversity rather than trying to find the common denominator. A 
few examples might make this less cryptic.  
                                                 
79 Cavell, “The claim of reason”, 171. 
80 See for example §32. 
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When a child for the first time sees a horse its father will probably point at it and say 
“Horse! Horse! See the Horse. That’s a biiiig horse.” If the child then smiles and says 
‘horse’, or something that sound a bit like it, has it then attached a mental label to the 
visual impression of it? When an infant cries out something that sounds like ‘mama’ for 
the first time it is not because it already knows the word. It is because it is any easy sound 
combination to make. If the mother then looks into the eyes of the baby and smiles and 
repeats ‘mama, mama’ while pointing at herself, does it suddenly dawn on the infant that 
it now knows the label for that person that is smiling at her? When a father takes his son 
to a football game for the first time and screams at the referee and throws popcorn at the 
field, is he then teaching his son alternative labels for a referee? 
Wittgenstein says we learn language by being initiated into practices. The father at the 
football game is influencing his son into becoming a football supporter by displaying a 
way of being. Learning is not the isolated intellectual process that many philosophers 
seem to tacitly suppose. Learning a language is a complex process involving the culture, 
the body with its necessities and limitations, the age of a person, our relation to those that 
teach it to us, what we like and dislike, and so on practically ad infinitum. If we look at 
how language works it is clear for everybody to see how little of language is attaching 
labels to things.81 Cavell summarizes the point beautifully: 
 In “learning language” you learn not merely what the names of things are, 
but what a name is; not merely what the form of expression is for expressing 
a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not merely what the word for “father” 
is, but what a father is; nor merely what the word for “love” is, but what 
love is. In learning language, you do not merely learn the pronunciation of 
sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the “forms of life” which make 
those sounds the words they are, do what they do – e.g., name, call, point, 
express a wish or affection, indicate a choice or an aversion, etc.82
An interesting corroboration of this view can be found in the writings of the psychologist 
L. S. Vygotsky (1896-1934). Under the heading “Internalization of higher psychological 
functions” he says that: 
A good example of this process [of internalization] may be found in the 
development of pointing. Initially, this gesture is nothing more than an 
                                                 
81 Cavell page 174: “But what I take Wittgenstein to be suggesting is: Take the label analogy seriously; and 
then you’ll see how little of language is like that.” 
82 Cavell, “The claim of reason”, 177-178. 
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unsuccessful attempt to grasp something, (…). (…) When the mother comes 
to the child’s aid and realizes his movement indicates something, the 
situation changes fundamentally. Pointing becomes a gesture for others. The 
child’s unsuccessful attempt engenders a reaction not from the object he 
seeks but from another person. (…) At this juncture there occurs a change in 
that movement’s function: from an object-oriented movement it becomes a 
movement aimed at another person, a means of establishing a relations. The 
grasping movement changes to the act of pointing. (…) Its meaning and 
functions are created at first by an objective situation and then by people 
who surround the child.83
What Vygotsky calls “internalization of higher psychological functions” seems to be 
parallel to what Wittgenstein calls “being initiated into a practice”. If nothing else, the 
comparison helps bring to light a misconception of Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘practice’: 
that practices, like customs, are things we can reject or accept on the basis of personal 
preferences. In the quote from Vygotsky it is obvious that an “internalization of a higher 
psychological function” is not something we can decide whether or not to act on, because 
we are talking of the formation of mind, not just of its instantiations in the activities 
anthropology describes. 
When I take the quote from Vygotsky as a corroboration of Cavell’s reading of 
Wittgenstein, it is because I believe that showing that language is not learned primarily by 
ostensive definitions is a strong indication that the language of an adult is as tightly knit 
to practices as when it is learnt. It is only less obvious. There is little doubt that 
Wittgenstein, from an exegetical point of view, sees this as a strong reason for rejecting 
the view that words can be analysed independently of these practices. Only because 
‘mama’ can be symbolized by the four letters “m a m a” does not mean that the word 
mama can be broken down and analyzed in non-”mama-practice” terms.84
Extending the use of a word already there 
Seeing language as a complex jumble of words with different origins not only means we 
have a different picture of how language came into being, but we also have a different 
                                                 
83 Page 56 of: Vygotsky, L. S. Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Edited 
by Cole, Michael, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner and Ellen Souberman. Cambridge (Massachusetts) 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1978.  
84 The arguments of this paragraph obviously need to quite a lot of fleshing out. This is something I hope to 
do on a later occasion. Although I am not as convinced of the argument as Wittgenstein seems to be, I 
believe it is a train of thought worth pursuing.. See also the footnote in the section of ” Craving generalised 
officers ” concerning Cappelen and Lepore.  
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picture of how language evolves. Much of our language use involves classifying new 
phenomena into the categories we already have. On the Augustinian picture this would 
mean something like finding a good category for a phenomenon or inventing a new 
category for it. On the Cavellian reading of Wittgenstein the situation is more complex. 
His view is best illustrated by an example. 
Cavell asks us to think about how we use the word ‘to feed’.85 When we feed a dog we 
either put something edible in its tray or give it some snack directly from the hand. When 
we feed a baby we use a spoon. We also feed a slot machine when we insert coins into it. 
And we feed the monkeys at the zoo when we throw peanuts into their cage. We might 
also say that we are feeding the family when someone asks us why we do not quit a 
boring job. All these examples use the word ‘feed’ but finding one thing common to them 
all would be hard. We could say that we both ‘feed’ the monkeys and the baby because 
we give them something to eat. But that excludes ‘feeding’ the slot machine. Likewise, 
throwing peanuts at a baby would not be ‘feeding’ it, neither would stuffing coins in the 
mouth of a dog. The key to understanding how language actually is, is that there is a 
family resemblance (see §§66 and 67) between all these instances of ‘feed’. Once we 
have been initiated into a practice involving certain words we continuously apply the 
words we know to new instances that are similar in some respects. In Cavell’s words: 
I am trying to bring out, and keep in balance, two fundamental facts about 
human forms of life, and about the concepts formed in those forms: that any 
form of life and every concept integral to it have an indefinite number of 
instances and directions of projection; and that this variation is not arbitrary. 
 
…to say that a word or concept has a (stable) meaning is to say that new and 
the most various instances can be recognized as falling under or failing to 
fall under that concept…86
Instead of saying that the diversity of language and heavy reliance on family resemblance 
is something we can explain after we have made an analysis of the core of language, like 
Augustine might say, Wittgenstein’s puts diversity at the centre of his conception of 
language. Whether the new use of a word is recognized as falling under or failing to fall 
under that concept cannot be established by a semantic analysis (alone), but only from 
                                                 
85 Cavell, “The claim of reason”, 181. 
86 Ibid., 185. 
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inside those practices, i.e. by a person who has the language in question as to her mother 
tongue. This is what happens in §200 where Wittgenstein asks us if we would call it 
playing chess to ‘dance along the rules of chess’.87
Rejecting the ostensive definitions model has consequences for how we look at naming 
emotions. Writing poems and books, making movies, painting, composing is not simply a 
matter of naming emotions. Learning the name of an emotion is a discovery we make 
when we learn more about ourselves. Finding ways of expressing emotions is not separate 
from maturing emotionally and making more fine-grained distinction in our emotional 
lives. Naming a new emotion is not just a matter of attaching a label, but of going trough 
a process - a process which will be different for different kinds of words. A process, 
moreover, which will include our personal history, our cultural surroundings, the 
framework of the human biology, etc. 
In the quote from Asli Erdogan’s novel the narrating main-character said that: 
However, now that I look at the letters I have lined up, on the white 
emptiness in front of me, I cannot see that man. I am still in lack of a 
language in which to tell about him. I am not strong enough, cruel and 
merciful enough. I haven’t starved enough. Words cannot give him his life 
back, but they can at least re-establish his name: He was a Human. 
The sentence “I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him.” lends itself 
towards interpreting her problem as being that it is the language as such that does not 
‘accommodate’ her experience. On this background I suggested that a philosophically 
inclined layman might ask something like: “Why can’t we just make up a word to cover 
the emotion we want to express? Couldn't our desperate need to express ourselves be 
satisfied if  we just ostensively baptize the emotion we have no words, and thus have a 
word to express it with?”  
The first point about this is that a Wittgensteinian response to the philosophically inclined 
layman is that, just because the main-character says that she “lacks a language in which to 
tell about him” does not mean that that is the real ‘problem’ here. Our language can 
sometimes confuse us and make us look for answers in the wrong place. In the example 
above the wording makes it seem like (on at least one interpretation) a ‘better’ language, 
                                                 
87 See pages 41-42 for a discussion of §200.  
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or at least a different language, might remedy the acute need for expressing the 
experience. 
The second point is that what is needed in the narrator’s case is not some word that will 
make everything fall into place. What is needed is an emotional and psychological 
maturation process. 
Adherents of views on language that Wittgenstein would oppose will of course not deny 
that a maturation process is essential when naming emotions. Wittgenstein would 
probably argue that they cannot have their cake and eat it. They cannot insist on analysing 
language by reduction to non-normative terms and still claim they want to leave the 
diversity of language untouched. But this is one of the topics I wanted to avoid by leaving 
for some other occasion to discuss what the role of philosophy of language is. 
What I hope to illustrate is that we from a Wittgensteinian view on language can make a 
contribution to the understanding of different phenomena of language. What for some 
seems like a stern outlook on the possibility of doing philosophy is the exact opposite: an 
opportunity for a fresh outlook and a productive examination of the world we live in. 
Wittgenstein is not only talking about language as an assemblage of words but “about the 
entire body and spirit of human conduct and feeling which goes into the capacity for 
speech”.88 That leaves us with a lot more, not a lot less, to study.  
The grammar of words for and words for emotions 
We have now looked at the question: “Why can’t we just make up a word to cover the 
emotion we want to express?”  The second question was roughly: “If it had been possible 
to point to an emotion and name it, would that guarantee that others would understand 
the same by the word as I?” Had it been possible to ‘capture’ the emotion in the 
baptismal process, then the listener/reader should supposedly grasp what the name was a 
name for. But, of course, language does not ‘transfer’ the essence of emotions into the 
heads of our listeners/readers. Such an idea might seem slightly more plausible when 
talking about concrete objects like ‘horse’, ‘Rolls Royce’, ‘knife’, etc. These objects can 
all be displayed on demand to a listener in a much more concrete way. The case with 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 168. 
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emotions is not parallel, although crying or smiling does give us a good indication of at 
least what kind of emotion we are dealing with. 
Wittgenstein expends a great deal of energy discussing the philosophical idea of ‘private 
objects’ in the sections known as the Private Language Argument. The idea is that the 
‘privateness’ of things like emotions is the reason they cannot be communicated in the 
same way as physical objects. They cannot be displayed and pointed to in the same way. 
With ‘private objects’ there is a first person/third person asymmetry. ‘I’ have a first 
person authority when it comes to saying what ‘I’ feel. 
The thesis that will be discussed in the following is that the reason for this asymmetry is 
not that objects are private but that it is the grammar of certain words that contain the 
asymmetry. The word we will concentrate on is “pain”.89 A good starting point is Zettel 
§545: 
Suppose someone explains how a child learns the use of the word “pain” in 
the following way: When the child behaves in such-and-such a way on 
particular occasions, I think he’s feeling what I feel in such cases; and it is 
so then the child associates the word with his feeling and uses the word 
when the feeling reappears. –What does this explanation explain? Ask 
yourself: What sort of ignorance does it remove? –Being sure that someone 
is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, 
instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our 
language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. 
Our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our 
language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct).90
Wittgenstein is here not denying that we learn the word “pain” because our parents repeat 
it to us. The sound combination “p-a-i-n” would not appear out of nowhere by itself. The 
idea Wittgenstein is trying to dissolve is the idea that words stand for things, and that 
learning and language is learning what sounds stand for what. Wittgenstein is making a 
point about the word “pain” that is similar to the point Vygotsky makes in the quote 
                                                 
89 Wittgenstein mostly talks of the sensation pain and not the emotion pain. Although there are differences 
between the two, they do not concern the asymmetry. 
90 A similar point is made in the §§302 and 315 of PI: 
§302: “If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too easy thing to 
do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel.” 
§ 315: “Could someone understand the word “pain” who had never felt pain? –Is experience to teach me 
whether this is so or not? –And if we say “A man could not imagine pain without having sometimes felt it” 
–how do we know? How can it be decided whether it is true?” 
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above about pointing. The far better conception of how we learn, not only what “pain” is 
the name for, but what pain is, is when we see that it is an extension of primitive 
behaviour. The word for pain was not invented by some genius who thought it would be 
useful to have a word to express “that type of uncomfortable sensation” with. The 
primitive pre-linguistic pain behaviour is inseparable from and prior to the word ‘pain’. 
It is this often overlooked connection between the pre-linguistic and language that is 
Wittgenstein’s reason for bringing in the concept of grammar. By grammar Wittgenstein 
means something more than whether a word is a verb or a noun. Wittgenstein has 
something more than such a surface analysis in mind when he talks of the grammar of a 
word. For Wittgenstein talking about the grammar of a word is supposed to shed light on 
the relationship between the word itself and its connection with the pre-linguistic features 
of human life. Such features are not only pre-linguistic behaviour, but also how the 
human body works, the physical environment, the psychological environment, etc. In 
short everything that affects us as humans. 
The concept of grammar is supposed to take into account the evolutionary history, so to 
speak, of a word. Knowing the information about a word that is listed in a dictionary is 
only part of the picture, and might even be misleading, if we believe that it lists all that it 
is necessary to know in order to understand a word. Describing the grammar of a word 
would be to give a long list of examples of when we can use the word, and what would be 
a non-primary use. We would have to stick primarily to giving examples because there 
cannot be given an exhaustive list of criterions for when to use a word, and when not to 
use it. 
By painting a broad picture of the grammar of words like pain, the temptation to see 
pointing and naming as the essential feature of language, dwindles away. Since we cannot 
separate the word ‘pain’ from all the things we do while we are in pain, like gestures, 
wincing, crying out uncontrolled, etc., it is no longer so clear what was so obvious about 
the pointing and naming idea. At least that is what I take to be Wittgenstein's point. 
Consequently the questions I suggested a philosophical layman might ask inspired by the 
example above from Erdogan’s novel, lose their force. The idea is no longer to explain 
how a name for an emotion can transmit information, but how the word ‘pain’ is an 
extension of the pre-linguistic expression of pain. In the pointing and naming picture of 
language it would seem like an incredibly lucky coincidence if I mean ‘the same’ as you 
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when we ‘exchange information’ about our emotional states. We need to put away the 
picture of words as entities that carry what I want to express over to my listeners, and 
replace it with a focus on the grammar of words. 
The question we were looking at was : “If it had been possible to point to an emotion and 
name it, would that guarantee that others would understand the same by the word as I?”. 
Whether “we mean the same by a word that names some emotion” is a problem that is 
heavily coloured by the idea that what words do is to transmit information. That 
understanding each other depends on whether our words point towards the same thing. 
This is of course true, and quite trivially true on a surface level. It is highly problematic if 
it is taken as being the mechanism behind language. Emotions, like for example pain, do 
not merely correspond with states and experiences but form an integral part of them. The 
word “ouch” cannot be separated from being in pain and analysed independently of the 
practices that make us act the way we do when we are in pain. 
When Wittgenstein proposes that we do grammatical investigations of words, he wants us 
to ”make a map” of how and when a word is used, so as to make ourselves aware of 
which practices the word in question is part of. A grammatical investigation of the word 
”pain” would be an investigation of when and which practices it is a part of. Such an 
investigations reveals that the first person/third person asymmetry of ”pain” is a 
grammatical fact about the word and the practices it is a part of, and not a fact about the 
world.  
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